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WAR AND PROGRESS

THE GROWTH OF THE WORLD INFLUENCE OF THE ANGLO-SAXON

BY

WILLIAM S. HOWE

Formerly of the American Consular Service in China

BOSTON

LEROY PHILLIPS

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PREFACE

In 1905, in a Boston paper, appeared an article by John Callan O'Laughlin, on the condition of Russia at that time. The following excerpt was then cut out by the author of the present work as well expressing his own viewpoint:

"They (the revolutionists) have commenced the agitation for political liberty, and where it will end no one dares foretell.

"It may mean a greater Russia, with hundreds of thousands of troops trained by war and ready vigorously to uphold the old traditions of the Slav race.

"But what is more probable to the Russian who dreads the overthrow of the autocracy is an independent Poland, a new kingdom of Armenia, a Jewish empire, a Finnish nation, a republic formed by the Great and Little Russians, and perhaps German acquisition of Russian territory. It is a terrible end of the vast Russian empire, and it is one which the Emperor and the government will strenuously endeavor to avert."

If, in only one or two isolated cases, the following pages draw conclusions as applicable thirteen years hence, as this little prophecy made thirteen years ago is indicative of the present, it is felt that the possibly rash attempt to deal with certain basic circumstances now facing us will not have been useless.

Although the various chapters might seem at first glance to treat of unrelated subjects, it is believed that the close connection will be realized when the reader has grasped the rather simple theme running throughout the entire discussion. That is, in brief, that the all-sided progress and moral security of humanity are dependent on the political and, to a certain extent, territorial control of the world by the Anglo-Saxons, for at least a short period in the immediate future. The reasons why this is an essentially different conception in spirit from the German idea of world domination are given in the body of the work.[1]

Accordingly the treatment is arranged as follows:

The first chapter outlines the great political divisions into which countries are gradually falling and discusses their nature. The second and third consider in some detail the principles and circumstances governing the relations be-

[1] Chapter X.

tween the Anglo-Saxon and the great and neglected Far Eastern group of peoples. Then come two short chapters devoted to certain so-called principles which the praiseworthy, but confused efforts to find moral rules to guide political action have brought into general attention and which are believed by the writer to be generally fallacious and apt to divert attention from the real and proper war aims. The sixth chapter considers the Russian situation in summary form, and the seventh deals with some of the more prominent delusions which seem to have afflicted the American and Allied publics and hampered the most effective prosecution of the war. The eighth deals with an internal problem of America, without the proper solution of which, the effectiveness in international action of this largest of the Anglo-Saxon units will be greatly hampered. The ninth chapter attempts a summary of certain obvious effects of the war up to the present, with especial emphasis on matters already discussed at length in previous chapters. The last considers the present war situation and makes proposals for immediate war policy on the basis of the central theme and shows how the proper comprehension of this theme seems to be vital for success.

Grateful acknowledgment is made to the

editors of *Asia* and *The Public*, for their willingness to have reproduced certain matter that has appeared in those magazines.

W. S. H.

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WAR AND PROGRESS

I

WORLD GROUPINGS

In terrible times like the present — terrible and great — in the clash of tremendous sections of the earth's peoples expressed in tremendous pushing friction at the front by the physically select of all races, and behind in co-operative organization on a hitherto unknown scale, managed by the most eminent brains that capital and labor can produce, supplying from the national bases constantly increasing power and material to render that friction more and more intense; when small nations are submerged, remade, resurrected overnight; and the principal antagonists are concentrating the forces of the church, the press, the school, the forum, of patriotic noble impulse and of unreasoned racial prejudice, to emphasize the purity of their own motives and methods and correspondingly emphasize the unscrupulousness and baseness of the purposes and acts of their adversary, and are reconstructing with dangerous rapidity their whole economic fabric in the continual effort to get ever increased efficiency and the last

ounce of "punch": — it is small wonder that one becomes lost in the sweep of events and unable to discover the least system in the confusion or perceive any well defined results likely to emerge from the chaos.

There are, however, certain wide tendencies continuing more and more to outline themselves, and they are clear enough to be readily distinguished by any one who will take breath and allow them to be brought to one's attention. And, in spite of the fact that the war is in some respect a struggle to protect small nations, and minorities in large nations, the infinitely most important result will be the acceleration of the evolution of ever larger political entities and the distribution of the power over the earth and its inhabitants among a very few unitary groups of peoples.

In treating this subject, it is proper to assume two possible hypotheses according to which the conclusions will vary. The first is that Russia adheres, even though weakly, to the allied cause to the end (which then must be a complete victory over the central powers). The second is that Russia makes a separate peace with Germany and is dominated to a certain degree by her.

Predicating the former alternative,[1] we find

[1] This chapter was written before the conclusion of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, but the principles discussed be-

the following groups of supreme importance: the Anglo-Saxon (British Empire and the United States), Slavic (Russia and smaller kindred nations), the East Asian (China and Japan). This classification may arouse protest at once on the ground that some of the world's great powers, such as Germany and France, are not included. The reason is that not IMMEDIATE strength so much as POTENTIAL strength must be considered. The primary elements in estimating a nation's possibilities are area and population. Without these fundamentals it is impossible for a group to play a really determining part in world affairs for any great period of history. The influence of Rome was so tremendous because her civilization spread through so many peoples and over almost all of the then civilized part of Europe, East Asia, and Africa. France was the chief power in Europe as long as she was the largest and most populous of the modern, well organized European states, but France has fallen behind, both because of decline in population and in area suitable for her people to spread their influence. Naturally other factors than mere size and numbers count, such as the resources of the land and character of the people, but nothing in the quality can eventually

low became more, rather than less, pertinent by the latter consummation.

atone for the lack of quantity or possibility of quantity. Germany, for instance, though smaller than the state of Texas in area, has managed through an extremely intense internal development and scientific, co-operative utilization of its resources to become temporarily a dangerous rival of the larger groups and to hold out for over three years against the chief part of the world arrayed against her. Yet we find Frederic Naumann, one of her most esteemed political writers, affirming that all Middle Europe (which project he assumes Germany will realize), can never ultimately rival Russia, Great Britain, or the United States. Latin America might hold a better claim to be considered one of the great groups so far as the question of area is concerned, but the sparseness of its population must for centuries render it helpless before any organized effort on the part of the sections rich in that requirement.

Let us now closely examine in turn each of the three groups we have picked for determinants and see why they may be so considered.

Taking the Slavic group first and confining our attentions to the chief member, Russia, we find that it has an area of eight million, four hundred thousand square miles, amounting to one-seventh of the earth's surface, and a population estimated in 1915 at one hundred eighty-two million as against Germany with

sixty-seven million and America with one hundred million. The yearly increase by excess of births over deaths alone approximates two million five hundred thousand, as against eight hundred fifty thousand in Germany and one million three hundred thousand in United States (of which over half is from immigration).

The country has great undeveloped mineral wealth and possibly the greatest area of virgin forest land in existence. The agricultural production, great as it has been, is nothing to what scientific methods can make it. The people are hardy, vigorous, powerful, but uneducated and backward according to Western standards, although the upper and middle classes have produced personalities of great scientific and artistic talent. From Vladivostok to west of Moscow one language is spoken and the Asiatic subject races are rapidly being assimilated and absorbed. The past few years a great tide of immigration has been flowing into Siberia and the people seem well awake to the possibilities offered by this vast section.

Coming now to the Anglo-Saxon group, a word of explanation may be necessary for the off-hand classification of Great Britain and America together. The fact is, that, in spite of past differences, present conditions and future political questions make it impossible that they should act in any other way than as a

unit in international affairs. There is the greatest of all unifying bonds — a common language,— there are similar points of view on political and religious subjects, there is all the common heritage largely remaining, in spite of different lines of development, and due to the fact that the original thirteen states were at first simply new Englands. The present situation has caused the two nations to co-operate against the common danger and before the affair is finished their economic and possibly political structure will be knit in a manner impossible to separate or unravel. The perils and problems that may confront them in the future must be faced together; it is inconceivable that one could be overthrown without bringing disaster close to the other.

Nor is there any doubt at all as to the essential unity of all the white colonies composing the British Empire. Canada, Australia, South Africa have all made sacrifices equal to those of the mother country, and all must have a proportionate share in the settlement and in future policy. The tightening and thickening of the mesh of the mighty empire is one of the great accomplishments of the war.

Furthermore the regions occupied by the inhabitants of North America, Australia, South Africa, are gifted with untold natural resources and with unlimited chances for increase in

population. The countries are already developed to a high degree materially and the people highly civilized. The combined area is about ten million three hundred thousand square miles, the population between one hundred and fifty and one hundred and sixty million.

India, Egypt, part of Africa occupy a somewhat anomalous position, but, due to the political bond with England, and as under British influence, must, for the time, at least, be counted as part of the Anglo-Saxon group. And possibly no less important than the proving of the white colonies has been the exhibition of loyalty displayed by the native subjects of the King. Revolts, there have been; traitors, there were and are; but in the main the war has strengthened the ties of the subject races with other portions of the empire. India is perhaps Britain's greatest problem; it is certainly her greatest opportunity. The taking of the German colonies in Africa gives the British the needed connection between their possessions in the North and South and makes it certain, if the Allies win the war, that Anglo-Saxon influence will be predominant in the development of the Dark Continent. Adding India and other such English possessions brings the total of the Anglo-Saxon group to over fifteen million square miles in area (between one third and one fourth of the earth's surface) and over

five hundred and fifty million in population.

In our last group we find the only other great division of mankind fit to be considered with the other two. The area of China and Japan is much less than that of the two former groups, amounting to four million two hundred thousand square miles; the population of four hundred and seventy-five million (using the usually accepted figures for China of four hundred million, though there is good authority for believing it less) is roughly almost three times that of the Slavic group and fully three times that of the white portion of the Anglo-Saxon group. China contains rich mineral resources, but in agricultural and forest reserve is far below the other two groups. In general, the natural resources of the third group, plentiful as they are, may be considered distinctly inferior to those of the other two. On the other hand, the East Asian group has the advantage over the Slavic of being in a more temperate climate, very accessible to the sea, and over the Anglo-Saxon of being more compactly situated.

The people of the third group are hardy, alert, enduring, vigorous, expansive; the Chinese, who compose the greater proportion, lack the power of a well organized central government to back them and even of strong private corporate activity; the Japanese are organized into a strong national unity and

also have strongly equipped private enterprises.

Consider now for a moment what the possibilities would be if the second hypothesis were realized — that Russia made a separate peace with Germany. With the present state of interior strife of factions and nationalities, it is impossible to conceive of any result other than the Teutonic powers dominatng Russia economically and possibly politically. Especially is this true when one reflects that a large proportion of the bureaucracy which have ruled Russia in the past have been of Germanic blood and drawn from the Baltic provinces, where German race and influence are strong. With German backing, this faction (which is accustomed to the task) would rapidly regain the ascendency throughout the country and Russia would be swayed in accordance with the policy of Berlin. The second, or Slavic group, reinforced, organized, directed by the strong efficient German machine, would immediately become the most powerful and menacing group of all.

And herein we discern the great, the absolutely vital reason why the allies must pursue this war to a complete victory. Rights of small nations must be vindicated, to be sure, but we would be blind if we did not recognize that the day of the small nation as an important factor in world affairs is past. Modern

conditions make it no longer possible for a small nation by a sudden burst of prowess and brilliant leadership to assume the centre of the political stage. It is only the great self-sustaining entities that can affect the course of events. A combination of France and Germany in an embargo against Belgium could render that state helpless without the firing of a shot, and the same applies in the case of Italy, Austria and Servia. Furthermore, it is natural for all men to desire to wield power and influence; in a small state there is not at all the same opportunity as in a large. Ireland, as a part of Great Britain, with representation in the British Parliament, may have, and, in truth, has had, the determining voice in decisions affecting the course of world affairs. As Ireland alone, independent, what would she be? Compare the great influence over the destinies of nations exercised by Massachusetts, Virginia, New York, as parts of the growing American commonwealth to what would have been the result had they remained small, lonely, struggling, independent countries. The writer even had the experience of having a thoughtful official of one of the small nations over-run by Germany, who felt for the Teutons contempt even above hate, confess that could he have had his choice between being a servant of his country as she was and a servant of her as a part

of the German Empire (willingly and peacefully acquired if such had been the course of history) and as a German official, he would have preferred the latter. No, the greatest engines of progress in the recent centuries have been the large all-embracing nations such as the British Empire. Built up by conquest and selfishness in many instances, nevertheless, the completed structure represents a great benefit to mankind, and to attempt to break it up would be as much a drive backward as has been our ill-advised attempt to force competition among railroads and other corporations when competition meant general ineffectiveness. At present there is a widespread recurrence of the doctrine of separatism in all countries — a doctrine to which the leaders of certain governments have, under popular pressure, hastily and unwisely subscribed, but this cry is due to the impulse in periods of stress to concentrate on the immediate and apparent trouble without regard for permanent causes. In the future this tendency toward the forming of ever-greater political sections will continue as in the past, but the war will help to evolve rules for the process whereby it must be natural, inevitable, and can never again be the result of selfish, cruel lust for conquest on the part of the stronger power.

The exact course of this development will

follow no definite formula. To a certain extent the process of integration may be voluntary through application of the principle of Federation. It is possible to conceive, for example, of Poland, Bohemia, and certain of the Galician Slavs being willing to form a connection with a free, enlightened, progressive Russian commonwealth. The unity would not at first be complete, but might include important functions, such as protection, and cooperation against outside interference. Once certain bonds are established and the principle and practice of working together are recognized, there is a strong tendency to gradually strengthen and widen the union as new problems arise.

But we can not avoid the fact that development may be both natural and inevitable and yet not voluntary. Certain states do exist, which, through no fault of their own, but through geography and history, constitute by their mere independence a hindrance to the progress of the greater number. Yet these states naturally are as jealous of the right of independence as others. Here, indeed, we touch a very fundamental question and one which offers the greatest difficulty to most of the various proposals of a league of nations. These usually imply a federation wherein all nations may enter and wherein all are guaranteed certain elemental rights — of which, of course, the most

important are those of existence and independence. But this might perpetuate injustice and reaction, for present national lines and divisions are not satisfactory, nor could any possible adjustment make them so permanently. Growth is the law of society and any organization interfering with it is foredoomed to failure. We, therefore, are brought face to face with the question of whether under certain conditions the world would have a right, for the sake of the good of humanity, to apply coercion to make a state forego one of the most cherished principles of all men and nations. This is not the place to discuss such a many-sided problem. It can be said safely, however, that the victory of the Allies will establish that no one nation can hereafter claim a right of unfettered aggression. All nations are effected by such issues and all have a right to be heard.

The fundamental reason, therefore, why the allies must pursue the war to a complete victory lies in the matter of world grouping to which reference has so often been made. If Germany repentantly admitted her wrongs, offered to evacuate France and Belgium, reimburse them for all losses, execute the perpetrators of the atrocities, return Alsace and Lorraine to France, give up her colonial possessions, these terms would still leave her victorious. For she would have retained her grip on the Balkans

and have gained ascendency in Russia. Given breathing space to organize the Levant, with its wonderful strategic position, and Russia with its great human and material resources, she would be able in the future to renew the contest with the balance entirely in her favor.

Even if she were willing to permit Servia and Roumania to be resurrected, the allies could never allow her to settle the Russian problem as she wished. She would, in a sense, have fought at least a draw with the world and the prestige of her achievement would be such as to make her still supreme in Turkey and the Balkans, even if she had no direct territorial connections.

There is only one possible solution for the Anglo-Saxons, unless they believe that the ideals and institutions of Germany should supplant their own as the chief factor in world development. This is to win a complete victory and make the territorial and economic readjustments necessary to remove the danger of Germany's controlling forces sufficient to menace their existence and position.

But while relentlessly pursuing the struggle against the present adversary, Americans and English can by no means afford to withdraw all attention from the third group. Not at any price can the situation in East Asia be allowed to go by default and the easy line of

least resistance be continued to be followed. Events have occurred and circumstances are so shaping themselves, that, if our policy is not altered, a danger will in time (not so very distant either) threaten us, even more sinister than that of Germany. Americans are in general entirely unfamiliar with the basic facts presented by the international problem of China and Japan, and it is intended to take up the question in detail in the next chapter. In order that its significance on world events in general and on our foreign policy in particular be appreciated, it is necessary that the great fact of the formation of a few all powerful world groups be realized and reflected upon.

II

AMERICAN INTEREST AS AFFECTED BY ALLEGED JAPANESE DOMINATION OF CHINA

China constitutes an area larger than that of the United States, possessing a long and splendid sea-coast and containing a population which the lowest estimates place at three hundred million. The country has great, even if over-estimated, undeveloped natural resources, and the huge population is hardy, virile, very industrious, and, withal, docile. It is still backward, according to Western standards, but is, nevertheless, far enough advanced to be widely influenced in the near future by the impact of modern civilization. The innate qualities of the masses indicate possibilities of gigantic power and achievement under proper organization, and the latter is vitally necessary because the people seem to have reached a point where they can be swayed into any of various paths of development by determined, purposeful, efficient pressure and leadership. The old social and ethical system is breaking down and the

mould of the new has not yet been fashioned. The resulting period of confusion is one where the people are peculiarly susceptible to outside influence and the next two or three decades are unusually critical. The line of advance, direction of energies, and general future of this immense portion of mankind will constitute the most important social and political problem after the war and one which America, from the point of view of her own interest and of her profound (and we believe sincere) interest in humanity in general, must feel a great concern.

The above seems like a truism to all who have given a thought to the larger aspects of the East Asian situation. It is the background against which the whole controversial question of Japanese activity in China outlines itself. But the unfortunate truth is that the American public have not had the essentials made clear. Much has been written from both the alleged pro-Chinese and pro-Japanese viewpoints and the intelligent portion of the people have been roused to the fact that there is a source of trouble in the Far East. It is generally admitted that the Japanese have gained a considerable control over China; it is known that the Chinese protest their actions as aggressive and unjust. But what is not evident is how American interest is involved to any great ex-

tent. Of course, it is remembered that years ago John Hay said something about an open door, and it is felt that we must be alert to see that American trade receives a square deal. But this is a matter that appears easy to settle by negotiation. There is, apparently, a growing tendency among the moderately well informed to admit the possibility that, in spite of agreements and protestations, the Japanese are determined and likely to dominate China. But the ultimate attitude is: What of it? Their methods may not have been exactly refined, but there have been other nations not exactly supersensitive to international morality. After all there is something in their argument about needing an outlet for their cramped population and energies, and have they not as good a right to a Monroe Doctrine as we?

The purpose of this chapter is to centre attention on this phase of the problem. Most writers have dwelt on the actual course of events and condemned or condoned the Japanese from the point of view of legal and ethical obligations between them and China. Facts have been marshalled to show that they did or did not intend to control China. But the most essential interrogation — should America actively interfere? — has received too little attention. It is time that this matter be isolated from other aspects and receive the closest, most

searching attention. The following analysis will not concern itself or express an opinion as to whether Japan has done or will do a certain thing, but only with, if she should try to do it, what course American interest dictates.

To aid logical treatment, the question may be stated in mathematical form, starting with two propositions, which are assumed to be true for the purposes of this discussion.

1. China can not manage herself. Whatever the causes, Chinese history and social system have not furnished the elements out of which the absolutely essential political superstructure of effective national organization and leadership can be evolved, and all present signs point to constant administrative deterioration and ultimate political disintegration.

2. Japan desires to manage China. It is her purpose to dominate the human and natural resources of China, and, supplying the organization and leadership, to direct them along the lines she desires, i.e., to become through them the controlling power in Asia, the Pacific, and possibly farther.

The question at issue is, should America allow Japan to pursue and effect this purpose or should she attempt to prevent it?

The contention of this exposition is that America should oppose Japan's policy in China for both negative and positive reasons. The

negative may be summarized by stating that the consummation of this policy would constitute a menace to America or at least to American interest.

The governmental system of Imperial Japan is still that of the rule of the many by a very, very few. The prerogatives of the Emperor are unusually far reaching. He alone can summon or dismiss the Diet or Parliament, can, during its adjournment, pass temporary ordinances having the force of law, can issue ordinances interpreting, amplifying and executing the laws of the Diet, can proclaim martial law, declare war and peace and make treaties. He is commander in chief of the army and navy, with full power over its personnel and organization. His authority is circumscribed only by the power of the Diet over the purse and its right to enact general legislation. But this Diet is not constituted on a democratic basis. It is bicameral and the powers of upper and lower houses are equal. The House of Peers is composed of over eighty percent of hereditary nobility and direct appointees of the Emperor. The lower house consists of representatives elected by all male Japanese subjects over twenty-five years of age who pay a direct tax amounting to more than ten yen. The effect of this qualification is to disenfranchise the bulk of the population. The proportion of

the electorate to the total has never been higher than three and three tenths percent and in 1915 was less than three percent.

The result is that the throne, or the influence that controls it, shapes the policies of the nation of seventy million souls almost without hindrance. As a matter of fact, the real power has always been in recent times with the Genro, or unofficial group of elder statesmen, which contains the ablest and most far-seeing minds of the Empire, some of whom have been instrumental in guiding it through the entire period of its history as a modern nation. The body is self perpetuating and usually leaves the routine of government to the cabinet, only intervening in broad problems of general importance.

Japanese industry, shipping, and finance is closely interwoven with the government through systems of subsidies, special charters, and semi-official management; thus the Imperial core of the country has immediate and complete control of the resources as well as the policy of the entire system.

With no purpose of invidious suggestion, but merely to bring the Japanese system more clearly into view by pointing out its similarities to a better known prototype, it might be well to compare it with the German. In both cases we find the widest prerogatives lodged in the crown. In Germany the Bundesrath, or

upper house, is composed of the representatives of the different rulers of the states of Germany; in Japan the House of Peers is in the main the seat of hereditary nobility. The lower houses are equally powerless, though the Reichstag is more democratic than the Japanese House of Representatives, as it is elected by universal manhood suffrage, whereas only a small percentage of the people vote in Japan. The natural consequence of such centralization is that the national policy in either case lends itself to the possibility of being dictated by cliques and private influences.

The fact that the Japanese conduct of relations, unlike the German, has hitherto been tactful, farseeing, and imbued with a desire to cultivate friendship with America and England, is no guarantee against the inherent danger from such a system did the course of events throw the principles and interests of these countries athwart its ambitions. Especially is this so if less capable hands than the present should hold the wheel.

It can not be calculated, either, that the early future is going to witness any radical alteration in the Japanese structure. The feudal and military history of the nation has implanted traditions in the common people which express themselves in a profound reverence for the Emperor and for warlike achieve-

ment. Dissatisfaction, there naturally is, but, as long as the standard of intelligence remains below that in the West, and as long as the rulers lead on to success, there will be no general support given to any attempt to uproot the autocratic system.

It is no wonder that the Japanese have been tempted by the condition presented in China. The average Chinaman himself is in some ways quite a wonderful individual. He is keen witted, of unmatched vitality and endurance, and, when unhampered by tradition and environment, is very quick to catch on to new ideas. His ability to stand monotony, as well as his skill of hand and capacity to live cheaply, seems likely to make his country one of the world's great industrial sections when machinery and adequate supervision are finally introduced. But the power of organization, either public or private, is undeveloped. The government is inefficient and has been looked upon as little more than a series of offices which may bring their occupants riches; attempts at joint stock corporations are usually failures. The sense of public responsibility seems to exist in only a minute fraction of the people. In fact, the different processes of long historical development seem to have made the Chinese and the Japanese the complements of each other. The strength of the former lies in the individual, of the latter

in state organization. The possibilities that would lie in a combination of the two, favored as it is by geographical proximity, seem obvious.

The argument, however, is frequently heard that incompatibility of temperament between the Chinese and Japanese would operate to prevent the former becoming tools of the latter. China, it is claimed, would be constantly seething with discontent and rebellion. A source of weakness, rather than an asset, she would end by patiently and systematically swallowing the Japanese, as she has assimilated so many conquerors in the past.

This contention sounds well, but it is founded on hope, rather than fact. Everyone who has resided in China for any length of time with eyes open knows that the ordinary farmer or coolie is interested in naught outside his own concerns. He would welcome any government that would give order and security and the most elementary justice, and the radically dissatisfied would be but a small percentage of the whole. One should also keep in mind the tremendous growth in the instrumentalities in the hands of a strong modern government. The Slav people of Austria-Hungary were undoubtedly aggressively dissatisfied with the central government (which is a more loosely knit one than the Japanese), yet the mere power of the administrative and

military organization of that government has kept them in line and made them very valuable (even though unequal to the German) martial forces. As for the assimilation theory, it should be calculated that if it took several centuries to overthrow two or three million uneducated and parasitic Manchus, it would consume a period sufficient for much to happen internationally, before absorption would have much influence on fifty million modernly organized Japanese.

It would seem, then, that general conditions would justify the conclusion that there is great possibility of a clash in interest between the ambitions and interests of Japan and America in the future, and also that Japanese domination of China, if unhindered, could be made effective. The situation is inherently dangerous, but what are some of the specific means by which our interests are threatened?

First of all, there is a direct military menace. The armed strength of Japan would become sufficiently superior to that of the United States to drive her off the Asiatic portion of the Pacific, and possibly off all of the Pacific and out of South America, though there is no prospect that continental United States could seriously be threatened with invasion. This may sound like a broad assertion, but is susceptible of proof. The combined population of Japan

and China outnumbers that of the United States by at least four to one. The rate of increase by births over deaths is greater in Japan than in America and will be greater still in the case of China, once even the most simple system of sanitation and preventive medicine is introduced and allowed to check the death rate. The respective number of fighting men which countries can raise is not always in exact proportion to populations, but there is no doubt that we would be outnumbered overwhelmingly. Nor should one suffer under the illusion that the Chinese could not be made into good soldiers. They are inherently peaceful, not cowardly, and have renowned military exploits in their history, like that in which they thrashed the Ghurkhas and invaded Nepal. In the Tai Ping Rebellion, a few thousand Chinese, officered by whites and trained and led by first, Ward of Salem, and afterward the Englishman, Gordon, did yeoman service. Again and again they routed forces many times their superior and really proved to be the decisive factor in the great internal contest. Furthermore, the struggle for existence is so intense in China that everything is given a mercenary aspect. It would be very possible to make the average pay of the army a little higher than the wage that could be earned outside, and, in such a case, plenty of recruits would always be available, who would

consider the army their occupation and would learn and perform the routine as faithfully and thoroughly as the Chinese always do that on which their livelihood depends. History has shown that no race has a monopoly of military prowess; leadership and equipment have given all peoples periods of conquest and expansion, and there is no reason to believe the Chinese an exception to the rule.

The question of equipment is a more complicated one. It divides into two components, — industrial facilities and requisite raw material. Many observers have emphasized the fact that Japan has not the manufacturing capacity to carry on single handed a war with a nation like the United States and have used this as a prime reason why we have nothing to fear from her. They seemed to lose sight of the principle that it is not present circumstances but the rapidity of growth that is involved in this problem. At this moment Japan proper is not in a position to furnish the mass of appliances needed in modern warfare, but she will be able to do so if she keeps up her present rate of manufacturing progress. Industrial Japan dates back at most only twenty years and in hardly more than a decade's time she has advanced from almost nothing to the point where she is rapidly becoming the first in the textile industry of the East, able to produce her

own fleet and naval armament, and a valuable asset to Russia and the Allies in munition manufacture. Great productive centres like Osaka have developed and every issue of Far Eastern journals chronicles the inception of varied new enterprises. Her ship-building capacity has increased several fold during the war period alone and the control of Pacific maritime trade is almost entirely in her hands. A continuation of the same ratio of advance will see Japan within a quarter of a century provided with a manufacturng establishment similar to that of Great Britain at present. Other nations will, of course, progress also, but their rate does not compare with the Japanese.

As for China, too much should not be made of the unsuccessful character of such enterprises as the Hanyang Iron and Steel Works, Yangtse Engineering Works, various cotton mills, etc. Difficulties caused by isolation, lack of allied trades, poor transportation facilities, are incidental to the beginning of industry in a new field, and there is no inherent reason why they should not be surmounted in the space of a couple of decades, if attacked by an enterprising people backed by an efficient centralized government like the Japanese. Nothing can obviate the fact that the cheapest and most dependable labor in the world is at hand in unlimited quantities.

When we approach the question of a supply of raw materials for manufacturing, we find that Japan is almost destitute of natural resources of the basic order. China is much better supplied. Of coal she has greater deposits than any other country. Of iron she has considerable, though recent estimates have been far more pessimistic than previous ones and it is probable that she will fall far below her future requirements. Copper exists in fair abundance, though it is somewhat doubtful if it is so placed as to lend itself to modern mining methods. In antimony China is first; in tin she is an important factor. Cotton can be grown in large quantities. In foodstuffs she is still self-supporting, though not likely to be indefinitely. On the whole, one may say that, although China's natural resources have probably been exaggerated, due to the magic of their uncertainty, they are still very considerable and sufficient for the groundwork of a great political union. Furthermore, in any possible struggle against the Anglo-Saxon it is probable that the Japanese rulers of China would be able to draw raw materials from Russia, and the finished product from Germany, were these nations no more than neutral. It is not an impossibility that Japan would have the open support of one of them.

It has frequently been pointed out that in any

contest Japan's communication with China and her avenues for raw materials would be exposed to severance by the greatly superior English or American fleets. This is so under present conditions, but would not hold true if she had been given time to make good her hold on China and place powerful garrisons along the coast. This war, as well as previous ones, has shown that, while superiority in heavy ships is the foundation without which the whole naval edifice would collapse, it does not suffice to root out an inferior force based on shore defenses. Battleship superiority enables a nation to keep the high seas open for its own merchant shipping and confine the maritime activity of its foe to interior waters, but it can not furnish means for penetrating those waters. In the case we are supposing it is quite conceivable that by mine fields, submarine bases established along the China coasts and her own islands all the way from Kamchatka to Formosa, aeroplanes and other means of defense against battleship preponderance, she would be able to devise means of maintaining her communications with the Asiatic continent.

Furthermore, there is the possibility that after thirty years or more of dominating China, the centre of Japanese government and power may have shifted to the mainland and severance of water communication would not necessarily

be fatal. This would become a probability after half a century of unmolested control.

The statement was made previously that, not only would our Asiatic position, but possibly our entire Pacific and South American interests might be menaced by Japanese sway in China. This, naturally, could only be if naval supremacy passed from us. This is a contingency not likely to occur so long as conditions in Europe allow us to concentrate our attentions on the East and so long as the Panama Canal remains intact and in condition to allow the ready employment of our Atlantic Fleet on the Pacific. Experience has shown that neither of these conditions can be absolutely relied on, however, and in ship-building and ship handling capacity our Pacific coast alone, with only two good bases (San Francisco and the Puget Sound cities) could not begin to hold its own with the magnificent coast facilities of a combined Japan and China. The Yangtse River alone could become a mammoth Clyde and gigantic fleets arise, emerge, and return in perfect security. How many Americans realize that for five months in the year it is possible to run ocean boats upward of twelve and fourteen thousand tons in size to Wuhan, a metropolitan area of a million and a half people situated six hundred miles from the mouth of the river?

There is another factor to be considered here. This is the danger to British interest any such enormous increase of Japanese power as we are supposing would entail. China is the neighbor of India on a frontier of about two thousand miles. Although the country is very difficult, it is not impassable and, after a series of strategic railways had been carried close to the border, it is difficult to see how a determined general attack from the north in tremendous numbers could be resisted by England from her distant position. If India fell, a territory containing approximately three hundred million people would pass from the first to the third of our world groups, as outlined in the first chapter, and all British Asiatic possessions must go also. Confronted by a power controlling Japan, China, India, Malasia, Australasia, it would be impossible for the United States to maintain a Pacific position at all — at least it could only be done by a grinding effort to maintain naval supremacy, in a race of armaments that would make previous ones seem insignificant. This is only another illustration of the truth that British interests are our interests and anything that threatens the great Empire threatens equally the great Republic. India has been called the keystone of the British Imperial System; it might also

properly be called the keystone of Anglo-Saxon institutions.

So much for the military menace. But there is also an economic peril resident in the control of China by Japan. The contingency that has been most realized, most feared, and most emphasized by American opponents of Japanese policy has been that Japan would use her political power to shut the door of China to American trade and preserve this last virgin market (except the Russian) for her own monopoly. That she would pursue this policy in so far as it were an advantage to her is evidenced by her stifling of foreign competition in Manchuria. It is doubtful as to how far it would be advantageous, however. It is an erroneous conception that views China as merely a section to be exploited for the benefit of Japan. The point that must be insisted on is that Japanese dominance would mean a real combination, a real linking of resources. It would be advantageous for neither part of a united Sino-Japan to have the other shut out completely from the advantages of world trade. Undoubtedly, also, the stabilizing effect of Japanese control upon China's internal condition would be reflected in more rapid development, hence greater buying power. For a while, at least, Japan could not begin to supply all the de-

mands, and she is too far-seeing to retard this development till the time when she could provide everything. It is not intended to minimize a danger that does exist, but, in fairness to Japan, it is only right to indicate offsetting circumstances. It is not believed that the commercial issue approaches in importance the military one, nor, indeed, another that is also economic. This latter is that presented by Chinese emigration.

The Chinese have been termed by one eminent authority the most persistent and successful colonizers of history. Entering from the North some two thousand years B. C., they have gradually worked their way to the South, East and West, as perpetually and forcefully as a glacier. The aboriginal races were absorbed or pushed to the South. The limits of China are being rapidly passed. In Siam they are the most influential portion of the people; in the Malay peninsula they are increasing faster than any other element; they are a problem in the Philippines and are pressing into the Dutch East Indies. They threaten to exterminate the South Sea Islanders. Australia in terror has erected an exclusion barrier. They had begun to react toward the North with such strength that Russia before the war had felt constrained to bar them for the protection of her Siberian provinces. The racial virility

of the Chinese is so strong that their characteristics seem to master and absorb all with which they are mixed. A case in point is that of the Jews. In China alone has this stubborn race met a stronger, and the once considerable Jewish communities have been almost extinguished. Wherever the Chinaman appears, he brings his capacity to live cheaply, his thrift, his capacity for unremitting labor, his passion for offspring; and he triumphs.

The white races have instinctively sensed the menace in the oncoming tide and have used their at present superior political power to protect themselves and their lands behind exclusion barriers. The attitude is in a sense a confession of weakness — an admission of inability to compete on equal terms in the struggle for existence — at least an unwillingness to do so. Mayhap the attitude is selfish and unjust — but it is deep-rooted and determined. It will probably be maintained as long as the Chinese standard is what it is, or as long as political power is sufficient. But how long will political power be sufficient if the Japanese are allowed to attain a position where they can put their organized power behind the at present not co-ordinated, centrifugal tendencies of the Chinese? Imagine the terrible weapon Chinese emigration would be as an auxiliary of Japanese political and military strength. The story has

often been repeated about the Japanese who, approaching a Chinaman who was scanning a map of the world, tapped him on the shoulder, indicated various portions of the map, and said, "You are forbidden to enter there, I am refused admittance here, together we can go anywhere." If we be not alive to circumstances, he is right, at least in the matter of the Philippines, Australia, and South America, if not California.

Besides the economic and military considerations, there is a very important group of reasons dealing with intangible influences that make it contrary to American interests that Japan should control China. It is very necessary for the future safety of humanity that in her present inchoate state the latter should be subject to the best moral influence possible. Such institutions as American missionary, educational, and benevolent societies should have free scope for their activities. The Japanese showed their hand in Group V of the Twenty-One Demands, wherein they required the right for their subjects to propagate Buddhism, and for their churches, schools, and hospitals to have the right to own land in China. They intended to carry on the same programme as that of Christian nations, and, from their own viewpoint, are not to be blamed, except so far as it constituted a veiled political penetration.

Japan would make her education, her ideals of patriotism (which are at present aggressive), her ethical ideas, her culture, possibly her language, the dominant ones in China, and, in general, the non-material elements which furnish the mainspring of national ideas and aspirations would flow from her.

This completes the survey of the various negative reasons whereby America should interpose resistance to the Japanese plan of constituting herself the hub of a great East Asian combination. Before stating the positive causes, which can be set forth much more succinctly, the reader is requested, if at all in doubt, to once more read the two hypothetical suppositions on which the discussion is based and remember that the writer has as yet expressed no opinion as to the actual truth of either.[1]

[1] See Chapter 9 below.

The logic of the map and of recent history certainly is strong evidence of the probability of future Japanese expansion, whether willingly or unwillingly. Starting with the acquisition of the Loochoo Islands in 1874, her territory and influence have progressed at an ever accelerated pace, until the present. The appendices of Prof. Stanley K. Hornbeck's "Contemporary Polities in the Far East" contain two interesting tables, one showing chronologically the different additions to modern Japan, and the other including pertinent quotations from the many official documents and treaties in which Japan has disclaimed just as clearly as in the Lansing-Ishii Agreement any intention to encroach on the independence first, of Korea, and latter, of China. For a

If China must be developed by external forces, the Anglo-Saxon countries — among whom America by geographical position and power is the first — should play the chief part. They are better fitted than Japan, because so many times richer. A vast surplus of capital is needed to bring quickly and completely the great inanimate possibilities of China's human and natural resources into active realization, and add them to the forces of world production. Their experience in handling enterprises on a large scale is greater than that of the Japanese; so, also, is their adaptability in inventing new methods for new problems.

They also have a greater surplus of mental and cultural talent which could be brought into play upon China's intellectual and moral forces. Tremendous effort will be needed to stir the Chinese masses in non-material matters — far more than on matters exposed to economic forces. Conditions are now comparatively favorable, as was pointed out in the beginning, but intense energy will have to be displayed to instil the higher ethical bases within the Chinese character (something the Japanese might not try to do). Thorough-going and far-reaching educational systems will have to be introduced, for which great sums of money

lucid and detailed account of Japan's policy toward China, one could hardly do better than to read this book.

and an abundance of well equipped general, professional, and scientific teachers will be required. As Americans, we must firmly believe that (so far as outside forces must impress China) it is better for China and for the world to have the ideals and civilization which we have developed through the centuries impregnate the Chinese people than those of Japan. Were they imbued with the influence of free institutions, and helped and guided toward a higher standard of living and thought, the emigration problem would not be so serious. Instead of a menace, it might become a blessing, especially if conducted to those places needing development and people. Great regions in Africa and South America would benefit without the shiver lest it might end in a civilization that would degrade all others with which it came in contact.

It is not by any means a chimerical dream that the diffusion of Anglo-Saxon spirit and influence among this so vast, so expansive, so vital, and so amenable portion of the world's people should finally (taken in conjunction with its already wide extent) supply that harmony in essential character and outlook on affairs which must be the groundwork of any mechanical effort at unity among the nations and the foundation of any system to prohibit war or enforce peace.

III

INTERNATIONALISM AND THE FAR EAST

It is one of the most elementary principles of politics that when national differences become identified with differences of race, religion, and trade ambitions, conditions most conducive to strife are produced. The fighting unit of modern times is the highly organized, centralized state. Out of its own history have been conceived and enlarged the qualities of pride of race, belief in military invincibility, desire for a world rôle, and other characteristics that give it a constant chip-on-the-shoulder attitude, but this does not suffice in itself to bring about a conflict until a clash with some opposing principle or interest also appears.

The phenomenon which made so many prominent minds believe the present contest improbable was the rapid and apparent growth in the last two or three decades of lines of cleavage in interest than ran athwart national boundaries. Financial activities were international, science and art were universal, a community of University and intellectual endeavor

was on the verge of being realized. Infinitely more important, as affecting great masses of people, was the growing affinity between the various national labor and socialist organizations expressed in international conventions.

But when the crisis came, whatever its underlying causes, the international grooves were not deep enough. They were intersected and their horizontal direction was changed to vertical, coinciding with and strengthening the national barriers. Socialists, labor representatives, intellectuals, and financiers all rushed to the support of their own governments. The old determination to preserve and extend the country and its system, the sense of national patriotism, moved stronger than any of the possibly more logical, but more recent and less rooted, cosmopolitan theories. It seems probable that had either party won a decisive and early victory, the impetus of national egotism would have been such that almost any doctrine of conquest and expansion would have been eagerly supported by all sections of the victorious states.

It happened, however, that the military elements were so balanced that a temporary equilibrium resulted, which it became more and more evident could only be broken by a wearing, gruelling effort to which all the life and energies of the people must be subordinated and

harnessed. As the strain and grinding grew always harder, with no sign of the end in sight, the bent springs of internationalism began to press slowly outward again. As organized labor became ever more indispensable, it grew more powerful, until it at present is in a position of even greater influence than it held before the war. It has its own representative on the British War Cabinet, and in both England and America is consulted and considered in regard to almost every move taken. In Russia what purports to be a working-men's organization is the supreme power of the state. Labor has enunciated its own aims and objects and the governments of the great Anglo-Saxon opponents of Germany have, either through wisdom and sympathy, or necessity, been constrained to alter their original peace aims to correspond. In Russia, internationalism of the most virile type, which sees the world only in terms of a universal class struggle, is rampant. In Germany, the strictly national lines, in spite of the lip formulas of her statesmen, have yielded the least of all to international impulses. The result is that Germany today finds herself assailed by the direct national military effort of France, England and America; by the international forces and tendencies of those three countries, which have been skilfully directed into the fray by national leaders

who have represented German militarism and imperialism as the worst foe of peace and internationalism; and finally by the fierce internationalism of the Bolsheviki, who see in the German system one of the most terrible of its capitalistic foes and one which must be dragged down before or as soon as capitalism in other countries. There is the strong possibility that the German government will be able to repress the very powerful international tendencies within its borders only by direct and constant application of force, and the snap, when it comes, may cause a general collapse of the national structure.

Thus the conclusion seems justified that the close of the war will see international, as distinct from national, energies, in ever accelerated operation and with a predominant position unthought of (unless in the distant future) before the war. The main problems will be those of the organization of similar functions and interests throughout different countries and the controversies will be between classes and occupations rather than localities. Unities will be economic rather than political. This is true UNLESS the elements interested in preserving the national division of society with its fighting organization are able to summon new forces as yet untouched by international influences to their assistance.

To find forces of such character and of sufficient magnitude we must swing our attention once more to the Far East. There we find a closely packed mass of peoples, totalling over one half of the world's population. China, Japan, and India are the chief members of this group and may be considered the only factors in the problem. In all these countries the greater proportion of the people live a life practically resting upon the margin of subsistence. Starvation is never far removed and the accumulation of a reserve of either necessities or luxuries is almost unknown. In China, the building material most commonly used is mud, and clothing is fabricated from the cheapest cloths. A low first cost is the prime requirement of any article or material. The masses are entirely ignorant in China, and in India and Japan education can not be said in any sense to be thorough or widespread.

Thus conditions are entirely favorable for the economic history of the modern industrial West to be repeated on a vaster scale. The introduction of machinery, and of modern methods of production generally, will be on terms most favorable for capital and for a centralized, autocratic, political system to back it. The struggle for life is so intense that there will be fierce labor competition for employment in factories and plants, and capital will be able

to dictate its own terms. There is no possibility for a long period that labor could develop a strong fighting organization, as it has in the West, which could make itself a power in industry and politics. Not that the Chinese, for instance, are lacking in any sense of occupational solidarity. There are both artisan and merchant guilds at present and they exhibit considerable power in a society as ungoverned as China. But the East Asiatic proletariat would be simply helpless against modern capitalism and a despotic government. There is no background of intelligence and self-discipline, as well as no means of creating reserves of living necessities, such as would be required in resorting to any weapon like a strike. And, however low the wages, however severe the hardships of labor, there would always be a hungry horde so much worse off that it would surge forward to fill whatever positions were left vacant.

Uninfluenced by any of the causes operating to increase internationalism in the more advanced societies, this great collection of beings would be so much clay in the hands of a centralized militarism. They could be hurled against the West in the three-fold attack of armaments, trade competition, and emigration. Coming some time after twenty-five, and before fifty, years subsequent to the close of the

war, it would seem likely to find national lines far in the process of breaking down. The effective fighting unit of the West will have lost its efficacy and it is doubtful if the functional entities, even if they have achieved harmony among themselves, will have developed any co-operative military organization that could stand against such a unified and tremendous external attack.

The question naturally arises as to how such a catastrophe can be avoided. The answer is that only one method can be successful. This is the simple one of preventing the powers of despotism, militarism, and selfish capitalism from getting control of the potential instruments in East Asia. And especially must China be so protected, for the position of China is such that under a strong government she could menace India far beyond the power of Britain, from her distant stand, to defend it. The situation is a pressing one — already China has passed in a dangerous degree under the sway of those very forces. It would be an ostrich-like policy to postpone the issue until so-called more urgent matters are settled. It is even doubtful whether consideration should be deferred to the end of the war, so rapidly are affairs moving in the East, and so indefinite seems the period in which the war aims of the Allies can be certain of attainment.

Circumstances must be resolutely recognized. One thing is certain — China will not remain indefinitely in her present state of aimless disorganization. The enlightened elements of internationalism and democracy must include her in the sphere of the activities, or aggressive, imperialistic despotism will. The people of America claim to be self-governing. Now is the time to show whether it is inherently possible for such a people to exercise foresight, either directly or through trusted leaders — the real foresight that provides for a contingency whose effects will certainly be operative in the future, but which are not yet actually felt.

IV

SELF DETERMINATION, NATIONAL EXPANSION, AND PROGRESS

"Imperialist" and "expansionist" are distinctly unpopular terms at present. The connotation has come to have a worse implication than I. W. W. As the first utterance of the latter results in a mental picture of chaos and violence, so the former produces a sinister monster reaching out with selfish tentacles to clutch the wealth and liberties of distant lands. Or, possibly, if our background has been fashioned by much reading of history and tales of adventure, our conception is that of far off cities with dark-skinned multitudes bowing before some chariot and a vast, indefinite combination of the national flag waving, and soldiers and bands swimming in the surrounding haze.

At present, "Rights of small nations," "Freedom for Democracy," "Self Determination" are the great watchwords. We even find the leaders of the Central Powers so carried away by the general current that they must veil their political ends under the slogan of "No Annexations, no Indemnities," and

"Right of People to Self Determination." The Allied Governments seem, at least nominally, to have subscribed to the latter principles. Probably their greatest and most commanding intellectual exponent is President Wilson, and his most untrammelled exposition his address to Congress on January 30, 1917, in which he said, "I am proposing, as it were, that the nations should with one accord adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world: that no nation should seek to extend its polity over any other nation or people, but that every people should be free to determine its own polity, its own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful." Analyzing this and subsequent addresses on our aims and peace terms delivered since America entered the war, his outlook on this phase of international relations appears to be about as follows:

Present political entities in the shape of nations and also certain peoples who have not yet attained political sovereignty (as in the case of components of Austria-Hungary) should be allowed to manage their own affairs without external interference, no matter how badly they do it and the condition of the greatest harm to the greatest number results. Under no circumstances is the imposition of au-

thority from outside against the will of the peoples involved justifiable.

This principle has not only been preached, it has been practiced, notably in the case of Mexico. It is a general course of conduct which at the present time the Russians are attempting to apply on a grand scale. It seems to be carrying all before it and, consequently, deserves a most careful scrutiny and should not be accepted off-hand.

The advocates of self determination at all times and opponents of annexation under all conditions have pronounced their rules as axiomatic — therefore they should survive the test of being pushed to a logical conclusion. Alsace-Lorraine should dispose of its own destiny, Bohemia should be allowed to separate from Austria; but so too should Ireland from England, and Ulster from Ireland, and certain counties of Ulster from Ulster. The North must recognize that it committed a historical injustice when it preserved the Union; England must admit that the whole process of building up her Empire in India, Egypt, and Africa has been a continued, ever-growing crime. In the future, not only must states be allowed to separate from the Union, but cities from states, and wards from cities, and precincts from wards. There is no need, of course, to consider the awkward position if a certain unit

should decide to sever its connection with another and a smaller unit within it should determine to continue that connection. Let us be fair — we must in equal justice extend the right to societies, clubs, fraternal and economic organizations, however large, however small.

The ideas expressed in the last few sentences are no less absurd than the attempt being made rigidly to establish and apply the principle of no annexation and complete self determination which is being made on a certain scale today. As the lives of individuals are so dependent and interwoven that the common weal makes it necessary to force them to be parts of a community and limit their activities by its rules, so must the principle of self determination of nations be applied with great discrimination in this modern, complex world. In fact, there is grave doubt of its useful applicability at all, just like there is of the rule of determining boundaries by historical justice, when, as in the case of Western Europe, so much of the ground in dispute has been at different times under the control of France, Spain, Italy, Austria, or some German state.

President Wilson has, of course, gone much further than the question merely of self determination. He has envisaged the grand ideal of, and is striving for, the realization of a world unity — a political organization that will

include all humanity. He thinks that the way to attain this is by a voluntary coming together of all unities in a federal organization that will enforce peace against any disturber. This is in a way incompatible with self determination, but the President has never pressed this latter doctrine to an extreme. He has, however, preached undeviatingly the injustice of all annexation, and therein seems to have remained uninfluenced by certain vital considerations.

It should be remembered that the great beneficent unities of the past, like Rome, and of the present, like the British Empire, have been brought about by absorption rather than by mere coalescence; that the building up of great nations has meant the triumph of the more virile, intelligent, progressive, and in the main more just forces ("more just" because intelligence and power unbacked by moral support have not succeeded enduringly, whether the case be that of Tamerlane, Napoleon, or militaristic Prussia). It should also be remembered that the present outline of nations, or even the improved one called for in the territorial peace terms of England's premier [1] and America's president,[2] is not laid in the lines of harmony; that great running sores (such as

[1] Speech of Jan. 5, 1918.
[2] Speech of Jan. 8, 1918.

the Balkan and Far Eastern questions), aggravated by religious, economic, and racial factors, exist and require convulsions like the present before they can be cured. Combining the nations of the present would be like putting a number of rough, sharp-edged, miscellaneous pieces of metal into a silk bag, and the unity would last just as long as the bag, under the rolling and battering. Only when the pieces have been ground, crushed, and welded into a smooth, symmetrical whole can an outer covering be fitted around.

There is no intention to disparage all the enlightened forces operating to draw the world together by peaceful means. International trade, international education, Hague conventions, above all, the growing strength of international organizations of labor and socialism bound by the circumstances of a common function, are all great agencies of enlightenment tending to bring people closer. Every means of coalescence should be resorted to first, but, if an absolutely foreign substance appears, it may be necessary to chew and swallow it. Coalescence and absorption are contemporary and complementary processes. The advance of one renders easier the progress of the other. The leaders of a nation should recognize them both, and in the responsible task of guiding their country, should openmindedly, and with

a sincere desire to further the interests of all concerned, take the course which the circumstances of the case seemed to dictate.

The task of the Anglo-Saxon countries is plain. The war must be won absolutely. We should vindicate certain small nations and force reparation for the wrongs done to them. But we should not fail to recognize that the course of history which has given such a result as the British Empire, though cruel at times, has brought us to a point where to attempt to undo it would seem a retrogression of centuries. It may even be that certain questions may have no solution but to continue the process. At all events, we should enunciate specific terms of peace no more than political exigencies make advisable. If our motives and ideals are sincere, we can trust ourselves after, as well as before, victory. Circumstances change rapidly, and, when we consider the extended and varied array of nations that with different structures, purposes, and hopes, have united behind the banners of England, France, and America, to oppose the German, it is well to hamper ourselves with no conditions that are not needful. The only safe rule is the combined one of justice and sanity.

V

SECRET DIPLOMACY

One of the numerous catch-phrases of the war which has come to be associated with something evil is "secret diplomacy." It seems to be considered an attribute of militarism and autocracy and awakens the same train of sinister impressions as "scrap of paper." The harmful effects of its practice are thought so far reaching that its abolishment is demanded by many liberal forces as one of the conditions of the termination of the war.

Like the question of self determination, it is believed that the rôle of secret diplomacy should be the subject of analysis before a hasty conclusion is reached. This chapter, accordingly, will briefly call attention to certain obvious factors which make it impossible to subscribe to the view now prevalent.

Originating from the hurly-burly of Italian city-state politics of the Middle Ages, the modern system of diplomacy has grown through successive stages to the present highly developed combination of science and art. It is scientific in that certain rather exact rules for its

conduct and forms have been generally prescribed and followed. It is artistic in that success in the higher and more delicate phases requires intellectual and social adaptability to a marked degree. The result is that in the European countries, where international relations have been a matter of vital import to the nations concerned, a specially trained class of diplomats has been developed to represent their governments abroad. These men, besides performing certain necessary routine functions indispensable between states, have acted as general intelligence officers for their governments and as their instruments in the course dictated by their interests.

Without enlarging on these known facts, it is sufficient to point out that diplomacy became almost as potent a factor in international competition as armies and navies. The Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente were both built up under a system of secret agreements. The most democratic (in a political sense) government in the world — that of Great Britain — has found it necessary, if it was to act strongly and effectively as an international factor, to give its leaders great discretionary power. The cabinet had and exercised the right to bind the country absolutely in secret documents of which Parliament never had an inkling until years afterward. The gradual weaving of a

great world coalition against the Central Powers under the hand of Sir Edward Grey was a masterly performance and one that could hardly have been achieved if he had not been endowed with a liberal bargaining power. He won the autocratic Romanoffs to the side of the democratic powers, without whose aid in the early phases of the struggle, the latter must have been vanquished. To be sure, there was a natural clash of interest between the Slav and the Teuton, but it required great tact and judicious compromise to turn this sufficiently to account to bring the Tsar openly against the Kaiser. In the same way it was only the right of the English government to make binding territorial agreements that enabled them to win Italy to their side.

Furthermore, it must be admitted that the obvious justice of the allied cause was aided in a tremendous degree by skilful diplomatic manœuvring in the matter of gaining American public opinion. It is perhaps a melancholy but an undeniable truth that so difficult was it to bring the American people to an appreciation of the issues involved that skilful diplomacy and a proper appraisement of national psychology on the part of Germany would have secured the neutrality of America even up to the present. Had Germany not forced the issue over unrestricted submarine warfare (which it

must have foreseen could damage England in no vital degree) and had she not used such crude methods of intrigue and propaganda, America would not have been arrayed against her today and the events of the Russian Revolution would have given her the war.

Now, if delicate international questions, and serious competition, and various clashes of interest between states are going to continue after the war, and the weight of all circumstances indicates that they will, the country that tries to proceed without diplomats and secret diplomacy will fare hardly against the one that employs both. If two nations are bidding for the support of a third on a certain question and one of them sends emissaries with full powers to sign a binding agreement, while the other must first thrash out agreeable and disagreeable features in a parliamentary or referendum discussion, there is not much doubt as to which would be successful. If all initiative is to remain with the people at home, the diplomats we did appoint would not be of the most capable type, for able men are never willing to remain creatures of routine and ornamentation.

As a matter of fact, our own political system has features that are a negation of the principle of entirely open diplomacy. Why, if otherwise, does our Senate frequently go into executive session when foreign affairs are to be discussed?

Why does not the State Department publish regularly and promptly the communications to and from our various embassies and legations abroad? It is safe to venture that some of these would make rather sensational and interesting reading.

The truth is that a nation at the present time can no more dispense with secret diplomacy than with an army. And the sins attributed to the former are, like those of the latter, not due to the nature of the institution, but to the use made of it. In the hands of an enlightened and responsible democratic government neither are to be feared. The correct procedure is not to deprive our government of what may be a very effective instrument for national security, but always to make certain that the government is the best that can be secured and then put confidence in it.

VI

"LEST WE FORGET"

Russia is in torment. She has finally thrown off the old régime that held her in the stagnation of poverty and ignorance for centuries, but the effort has rent her asunder and left the fragments helpless, confused, disunited. She has formally made peace and lifted the siege of the Central Powers, and, even though this action may be considered that of a faction liable at any time to be displaced by another of different type, she is so weakened that the war chieftains of the Allies have recognized that under no circumstances can direct appreciable military aid be expected from her. The unthinking are prone to turn upon the Russians with heedless condemnation and term them either traitors or insane. But it is precisely at this time that one should not be unthinking. Rather should one attempt an honest appraisement of their past services to the Allied cause.

1. When the Germans seemed to be carrying all before them in the series of operations culminating at the Marne, the Russians invaded East Prussia, although not properly prepared

for such an enterprise, and attacked the Germans so fiercely that they withdrew at least a few divisions from France (where every man then counted) and sent them to the East. The Russians were badly defeated at Tannenburg, but their sacrifice had helped to relieve the pressure on France and the crisis of the Marne was safely passed.

2. The Russians soon after routed the Austrians in the battle of Lemburg, in which it seemed, for a moment, as though they had cut to pieces the main army of the Dual Empire. They followed this up by over-running Galicia and again attacking East Prussia. This series of events caused the Germans once more to send vital forces to the East just when they were making their second attempt in France.

3. In the spring of 1915, the Russians took Pryzemysl with its garrison — the most considerable capture of the war — and fiercely assailed the Carpathian defenses. This was one — possibly the most decisive — of the reasons influencing Italy to enter the war at the time she did.

4. The Germans, now apparently realizing that the East had become the most important theatre of the war, began their famous offensive, and for six months the Russians, ever fighting, were pushed back in the most disastrous series of defeats of the war. Their losses in

men ran into the millions and one of their greatest manufacturing districts passed into the the hands of the foe. Warsaw, Brest-Litovsk, Kovno, Grodno, Vilna, Kovel, all fell. They finally halted far in the depths of their own country. While this great disaster was overwhelming them, the French and English in the West were apparently unable to move effectually to relieve the pressure on them.

5. The result of the foregoing was the entrance of Bulgaria on the side of Germany, and the quick campaign that annihilated Servia and Montenegro and opened the way from Berlin to Constantinople. England left the Dardanelles.

6. At this moment, when events on all sides looked the darkest for the Allies, the Russians in one of the sharpest, most brilliant actions of the war, scaled the snowy Caucasus and captured the chief stronghold in Turkish Armenia — Erzerum. This was not in one of the main spheres of fighting, but, coming at such a gloomy moment, it may be called the Trenton of the war.

7. In the late spring of 1915, when the shadows still rested on the Allies — the Somme offensive had not begun, the English surrender at Kut had occurred, the Germans, though at enormous cost, were still progressing at Verdun, and, worst of all, the Austrians were driving the Italians before them from the Trentino and had

reached the edge of the fertile plains of Lombardy — the Russians suddenly began what can justly be called one of the grand offensives of the war and made two great breaches in the Austrian line, retaking Lutsk and threatening Kovel. The effect was magical. The Austrian offensive against Italy ceased at once (of course the Italians by this time had managed to re-align their troops to meet the Northern menace, but it is doubtful if they alone could have stopped the advance), and the Verdun attacks lost force. The Russians slowly fought their way on until they over-ran Southern Galicia once more and again attacked the Carpathians. At the same time they made a further advance in Asiatic Turkey, capturing Trebezond and Erzingan. The consequence of this series of successes was that Roumania felt the moment propitious, and, at last, allowed herself to be drawn from her neutrality to the side of the Entente.

8. The Russians managed to send small units to fight with the Allies at Salonica and in France, chiefly valuable for the moral effect.

9. During the war the Russians established national prohibition, almost finished double-tracking the Trans-Siberian Railway, and built an entirely new railway to the Port of Kola, near Norway. They increased the manufacturing facilities of the country.

10. Their great accomplishments were secured in spite of a weak monarch and strong reactionary court party opposed to all reforms and containing a large pro-German element. They produced no statesman who could be called great, in the sense that Lloyd George or Briand is great. Their military leadership was good, but there was no one to measure with Hindenburg or Mackensen. In fact, it was a people's war with Russia; it was, first of all, the stupid, but steady and enthusiastic, determination of the Russian masses, backed up by the employment of all the talent that the merchant and professional classes could muster, that carried on the war for almost three years. Peasant cooperative societies, chambers of commerce, district councils, labor organizations, Red Cross institutions, all put their shoulders to the wheel and the vast efforts had their effect, in spite of mediocrity at the top.

On the whole, it seems fair to say that for two years Russia bore the brunt of the war for the Entente. The English fleet was vital; without the unexampled valor of the French all would have been lost,— in fact, the three Allies were mutually indispensable. But the Russians seemed to carry the greatest burden, confronted from the first by practically the entire Austrian army, the larger proportion of the Turkish army, and a fraction, amounting for long pe-

riods to almost a half, of the German forces. They fought the vastest battles, sustained the greatest defeats, and won the greatest victories. Up to the fall of 1916 it seemed that it would be their steady, ever-increasing, glacier-like pressure that in the end would wear down the organized efficiency of the Central Powers and make possible some brilliant stroke by the French and English in the West that would end the struggle.

But such was not to be. The Tsar's government went from incompetency and oppression to terrorism and treason. The Russians were forced to turn from their external to the internal enemy. They succeeded in throwing off the hampering incubus, but at the cost of national strength. Their own heedless actions and announcements have taken from them the fruits of their efforts. Their unexampled sacrifices are to have their reward, not in an accession of external political strength and influence, but in internal liberty which, though at first synonymous with chaos, may later blossom into ordered freedom. But they are threatened with a new autocracy, more dangerous because more efficient, than the old. In heaving off their own bureaucracy they have put themselves at the mercy of the German. It is for us, the Western Allies, who at last, by virtue of their efforts and sufferings, are in a position to win the victory

unaided, to avert the impending catastrophe. We can not abandon the Russian democracy. We must look through and over its present madness in its new garb of freedom back to the recent period, when, garbed as a slave, with the dead weight of a cruel and incompetent master on its shoulders, it grappled with a terrible adversary and so battered him as to make our triumph possible.

VII

DELUSIONS OF THE WAR

In a conflict as great, as complex, as all pervasive as that now racking the world, it is not to be wondered at that ninety-nine per cent of the people should fail to distinguish cause from effect, real from unreal, the essentials from minor considerations. The delusions have possibly been greater among the masses of the Central Powers than among those of their opponents, but in the latter case they have done infinitely greater harm. This is because the public opinion of democracies must, if strong and widespread, influence the leadership and general policy (to a certain extent, even in rather technical matters of strategy) far more than in countries like Germany, where it can be easily diverted or, if necessary, disregarded. In an as intelligent a nation as America and one where popular belief is reflected so quickly in national policy, the people should be taken into the confidence of the government and the broad and simple outlines of national strategy explained. Nothing can be divulged which is

not already obvious to the German military specialists, and the unified backing of public opinion, which alone will prevent delay and fatal vacillation, will be secured. If the war can be won by proceeding steadily and with all possible intensity along certain lines, the people should know what these lines are. With the Allied resources so greatly superior, there must be eventual success, provided the right plan is consistently pursued; and since, under modern conditions, it is impossible to conceal large plans and operations, secrecy in the main outlines is not so necessary as care and persistence of execution. Certain misconceptions and delusions about the war have arisen, and become widespread among the Allied peoples, which have hindered in an incalculable degree the persistent concentration of effort upon the essentials that alone can bring success.

The analysis of delusions which is now to be attempted will be divided into two parts, the first dealing with misconceptions as to why Germany has won the war up to the present, and the second, why the Allies have failed to overcome her in the four years of strife. This may seem like a distinction without a difference, and, in truth, as adopted as an aid to clearness of treatment rather than because there is any real demarcation line within the whole series of mutually overlapping and melancholy facts.

The greatest of all delusions concerning Teuton success is that caused by the proverbial statement that it is due to the fact that Germany had been preparing for this war for some forty years. The impression is studiously imparted that, since the unification of the German Empire after the Franco-Prussian War, its rulers have been steadily building an organization and bending every effort to the achievement of a state of readiness which should make victory automatic, when the button was finally pressed on the long selected date of August, 1914. This assertion, reinforced by all the sweeping details, such as the encircling of the main cities of France and Belgium with artillery emplacements disguised as tennis courts, is bound to leave a conception that is erroneous (irrespective of the truth of the details). The facts are that the German Empire, having been born and made of blood and iron, determined to maintain its superiority in these essentials and, whatever the cost, to keep somewhat in the lead of its neighbors in the race of number and efficiency of armaments. This was necessary for the aggressive intentions undoubtedly harbored (though in probably by no means the specific form generally believed), and could also be justified from the standpoint of defense in the same way that the English democracy has always maintained that no security on

the sea could be assured, unless a fleet offensively superior to any possible opponent was provided. So far as a specific plan for this specific war was prepared, it naturally was evolved when the alliances of the latter part of the last century made it almost certain that in any continental conflict Germany would be assailed by Russia behind and France in front. The German staff, therefore, worked out its plan on this basis, as was its duty. So did the staffs opposed. The corollary to the general assertion about German preparation for this war is, usually, that they sprung it on an innocent, unsuspecting, and unprepared world. This is two-thirds false. The French, for example, were innocent, but they were neither unsuspecting nor unprepared. If they had been, the war would have been over with a complete victory for Germany before America ever awakened and decided to give its "million men" a chance "to spring to arms over-night." The French were not so prepared up to the last detail as the Germans, but they were prepared. Furthermore, even the contingency that Germany should go through Belgium seems to have been worked out between the French, English and Belgian governments. It ought to have been, if it was not. The writer heard a discussion of the general situation by an expert — not a German — two or three years before the

war, in which it was stated that the Germans would probably make their chief move through Belgium.

Let us consider what actually happened. The German plan, realized by all observers, was to first eliminate France, then turn upon Russia. All the minute detail, precision, foresight, for which the Germans are noted was put into the plan of gaining a sufficient start in time and numbers to overwhelm the French at the outset. For this were constructed the special heavy guns which were to batter down the fortified towns of Belgium, reduce Verdun, and make certain the speedy surrender of Paris. For this were the tennis courts secured, arranged, and concealed. For this, were the German spies established at every point of the routes to be traversed. The plan was not only thus elaborated; a tremendous effort was made to carry it out, with a ruthless disregard for the losses it entailed. But it failed — failed from the cumulation of many causes, probably the greatest of which was the counter plan which the French had prepared to meet it. After three months of war, a line of trenches from the sea to Switzerland barred the Germans, who had failed to break it with superior numbers and saw this superiority gradually passing from them. Behind it the Allies were free to develop their resources, and the Ger-

mans, with their preliminary plans and hopes in ruins, were faced by all the chief powers of the world, except the United States. The years and minuteness of the preparation for this specific war had given them a rich industrial section (Belgium and Northern France), with important iron mines; but it had availed little in the great fundamentals of the war.

The first three months of the war, for which the Germans were undoubtedly far better prepared than the Allies, were, in the larger sense, a colossal German failure. The remaining period up to the present has seen them marching from one tremendous success to another. The handicap of the German was soon overcome; he paused, took breath, and has continued to draw away ever since. The German leaders set to work to rebuild their edifice on certain great foundations of their national life — foundations in which their superiority was not ephemeral and could not be endangered by the Allies until after years of effort.

These foundations were the same that had brought Germany her great successes in peace as well as in war. They were those of material and spiritual education and of the national fibre. The same specialization, the same scientific spirit, the willingness to study each case as a separate problem and fit measures to it, rather than hope it will fit in with accustomed methods,

which were giving Germany gradual control of the industrial markets of the world, were what proved her salvation in time of war. The very high level of German education in all stages has done far more to win her the war than most of the immediate preparations in the way of armaments. The spirit of collectivism in Germany, the willingness to merge one's self and one's all in a great co-operative system has been much discussed, and herein, indeed, is perhaps the greatest of all the fundamentals. But not sufficient recognition seems to have been devoted to the individual excellence — oftentimes in more than their specialized field — of the units with which the great German collective machine has been constructed. This is no apology for a system that undoubtedly fails to produce an individual so well-rounded and so occupied in the questions of individual morality and rules of personal conduct as the Anglo-Saxon one. But it is a great fallacy to regard all Germans as puppets who are helpless when the guiding hand from above is removed. The exploits of German U-Boats, of their raiders keeping the seas for many months and living on the supplies from their captures; of the crew of the *Emden*, who, when that audacious ship finally met her doom in the East Indies, escaped in a small boat to Arabia, crossed the desert and eventually reached Berlin through Turkey; of

Admiral Von Hintze, who passed back and forth through England in disguise and who eluded the Japanese by acting as a coal stoker — yet who is one of the most suave and polished of diplomats — should all disprove this belief. The German firms in China, shut out from all their accustomed import and export trade at the outbreak of the war, readjusted their business, did statistical and other analyzing work, kept their organizations together, and in some cases changed the character of their business, and both bought and sold among the Chinese. They maintained themselves for about three years, until China entered the war against them.

In general, then, it may be stated that the primary cause of the German success has been their collective system combined with high individual ability and efficiency within the system, the whole cemented and preserved by a deep patriotism of obedience. It is the patriotism of obedience that has enabled the Germans to always get the start on the Allies in matters of internal organization. In the early months of the war, the German government took over the control and distribution of the most important food products. Government control of mines and sources of supply of important raw materials, conscription of labor, combing out of industries, employment of women on a wide scale, were measures all adopted before the

French, and a long, long time before their partial adoption by the English. This is one explanation of the reason for the manner in which the Germans have kept as close to the Allies as they have in man power. They were able to take a larger proportion of their population because they organized themselves so they could. The Allies have been forced to follow their measures in the main, but have always lagged one or two behind. It is not especial pre-war preparation that will account for most of her moves, except so far as the whole trend of discipline and collectivism of German life can be called a preparation — and her development would probably have been to a large degree along these lines if her endeavor had been peaceful, rather than militaristic.

The custom of treating all German exploits with a deprecatory wave and the remark, "Oh, well, they ought to win, they have been preparing for this for forty years," is at present doing great harm; it is not increasing condemnation of her course, which is already universal, and is distracting attention from the real sources of her strength. Credit should be given for her tremendous efforts, the disciplined sacrifices of her people, the subordination of every resource and effort to the common end.

Another and decidedly important element in

German success is to be partially attributed to luck. This was the discovery at an early period of the war of her greatest leaders. Mackensen, Hindenburg, Falkenheyn, Ludendorff, were all prominent four months after the outbreak, and she has had the continuous use of their talents up to the present. The same can not be said of the Allies. Foch, in spite of great services at the Marne and on the Yser, dropped back into obscurity for a long period and no other leader has yet earned the right to be classed with the greatest German chieftains (in the exercise of the great qualities of foresight and imagination, Lloyd George seems to have envisaged the general trend of military events better than most of the professional soldiers). If the German military leadership had been accompanied by equally wise diplomatic and civilian guidance, they might well have triumphed ere this.

Let us now shift our viewpoint and examine some of the mistaken reasons given why the Allies have not done better against Germany, and some of the fallacious theories as to how the war should be won. It will be necessary in this process also to point out what seem the real causes and the first of these lies in the difference in the nature of the patriotic impulse actuating the contestants.

The Germans possessed, as has been pointed

out, the patriotism of obedience. The English and French possessed a patriotism equally sacrificing and founded on individual nobility and idealism more inspiring, but it was not a patrotism which would delegate all intellectual functions to the head of the state. The Englishman would make any sacrifice if he could be shown that it was necessary or even beneficial to the winning of the war, and the same is true of the American. But they must be "shown," and demonstration on a large scale and through experience takes time. It is inconceivable that some of the brilliant minds of the Allied governments can not foresee the necessity of the proper measures of internal reorganization as well as the Germans. But they can not introduce them with a stroke of the pen — the way must be cleared of prejudice and interest, public opinion educated, the country prepared. The end is achieved eventually, but time is lost. This defect seems inherent in our system, but, if it becomes necessary to eliminate it in order to win, we may have to take the full step of temporarily adopting the Prussian system, which, however detestable in other ways, has proved itself in war. We are deluding ourselves if we think we can be nationally efficient and at the same time retain the prerogatives and privileges of peace.

One common delusion is the attributing of everything that goes wrong to German spies and

German propaganda. A United States Senator recently declared that there were four hundred thousand German spies in this country. If anything goes wrong in a factory, if progress seems slow in munition plants, if a strike takes place in a shipyard, the trouble is blamed upon German spies or German propaganda. A casual fire in a grocery store, an explosion with cause uncertain, a derailment of a freight car, — all are the work of German spies. Criticism of men in power, a demand to know the true nature of agreements between Allies, a request for exact information upon common and generally admitted matters — these are usually termed German propaganda. A spell of indigestion, and we jump to the conclusion that the baker is a German hireling; a German name, and its possessor becomes an object of dread. We apparently forget that the German government is too wise to station a spy every few feet, as seems generally supposed. Four hundred thousand spies would tread on each other's toes and ninety-nine per cent of them would be more useful in Germany as producers and soldiers. Then, it is very doubtful whether much of the information they could collect would be anything but the obvious and what could be more accurately obtained in newspaper files. That the German spy system is present

and dangerous should not be denied, but it is absurd to believe that it is responsible for one percent of the things with which it is charged. The *New Republic*, for example, states that practically none of the two hundred alleged ground glass cases investigated have been proven authentic. On the whole, the spy mania has done more harm than good. It has been made to serve as a cloak to our own inefficiencies and inexcusable delays. One bungling official high up in a department at Washington would be apt to cause more harm than many, many German spies.

One hideous evil has resulted from the spy delusion. Men have been lynched — whether innocent or not matters little — on the allegation that they were German spies. These acts have been condoned, sometimes by sources from which we should expect a higher sentiment, on the ground that the people were impatient because the law did not deal sharply and quickly with intrigues against the nation's welfare. Our conscience should tell us that this is not the true reason. Lynch law is inspired, under any mask which we may try to throw over it, by the desire to give play to the basest instinct dormant in human nature, the wish to gloat over the suffering of another, and lynchers are wanton murderers. Lynch law is Prussian mili-

tarism run riot, and should be dealt with at once as we are planning to deal with Prussian militarism eventually.

Another delusion, and one especially appealing to American character, is the belief and hope that this, that, or the other new invention will overwhelm the Germans and bring the war to an immediate close. How unlikely this is, any military student will realize. Great as have been the innovations in the war, constant as is the process of adopting new equipment, new tactics, new methods, the most remarkable accomplishments have been along orthodox lines. The greatest single inventive advantage of the war came to the Germans in the early weeks. What was the invention? Nothing more than an extra large type of heavy artillery, the existence of which had been remarkably well concealed. For the moment the Germans had more than the usual advantage in one of the common military factors and this gave them unexpected success. Even in the field of aviation, the great progress has been rapid gradually, so to speak, and both sides have approximately kept pace. If we are wise, we should pray against any great and sudden innovation. If the factors remain as now, our superior resources should give us the victory; any sudden departure in methods of warfare might put the Germans once again on even foot-

ing, even though the Allies were the first to introduce it.

Another belief with more basis than the above, but still a delusion in its effect on most people, is the reiterated statement that "the war will be won in the air." This may be true in the very limited sense that, if other things are somewhat equally balanced, the command of the air may be the decisive factor, but the prevalent impression seems to be gaining ground that if we only build planes enough and obtain a complete control of the air, this alone will give us the victory. This is utterly erroneous. Important as is aviation, there are no grounds for believing that before the end of this war it will have attained anything like the fundamental importance of infantry, artillery, transportation system, and generalship. The superiority of the Allies in the air, which has always existed in a greater or less degree, has not enabled them to make any large advances. Nor could it prevent, although it hindered, the recent great advance of the Germans at the Somme, when they had accumulated infantry and artillery superiority. The air is very important. Every effort should be put forth to make ourselves supreme in it, but a foolish belief that it alone is decisive and that a system of quantity air-plane production under Mr. Ford or some other expert is a panacea for victory should not be al-

lowed to clog our efforts in the even more fundamental matters of men, guns, ships, and shells. The war will not be won in the air, under the sea, or in Mars, but on the land and by the fundamental all-round superiority of the Allied armies and their leaders.

What is next referred to can not be called a delusion so much as premature judgment. It relates to the very delicate subject of the ability of the chief executive of the country. With the exception of occasional voices of dissent from certain comparatively small classes and sections, there seems to be an almost unanimous belief that President Wilson is just the man for the crisis. His name is constantly associated with that of Washington and Lincoln, and the people have settled back with a sigh of contentment that, in spite of a few minor defects, we have a really great man to guide and inspire us.

This may be true, and it is devoutly to be hoped. But the requirements of the Presidency are terribly exacting. Two conceptions must be capably fulfilled if any occupant is to be termed "a great President." The first is that the holder of that great post should be the focus of the thought and hope of the country. He should interpret public opinion, respond to popular sentiment, define and mould our national aspirations. This task requires unusual sensitiveness to the mentality of the people, to the

tendencies and currents of the thoughts and feelings of all classes. It requires, even more, foresight and broad vision, for the man worthy to be our President must not only represent, but guide. The President must fulfil this task by the recommending of general legislative measures to Congress and by enunciating in his speeches to that body and to the public the broad policy the nation should pursue.

The second function of the President is that of acting as the general manager of the vastest of all corporations — the United States Government. We are all stockholders in that corporation; our subscriptions are measured by the taxes and loans we have contributed, and our dividends consist of the benefit we draw from the multifold activities of the corporation. The scope of its business comprises all matters in which we commonly have concern and is potentially limitless. For its general manager the firm needs a man of sound judgment and prompt decision, with his finger attuned to the pulse of the gigantic machine, quick to detect flaws and quick to remedy. Above all, he must be able and willing to pick the most capable assistants, whom he can trust to carry out his general directions, and to whom he can delegate with confidence original authority in all but the broadest and most vital problems. In the present crisis he must be our field captain in the

ebb and flow of the greatest contest of history, on the result of which depend the preservation and perpetuation throughout the world of the principles we hold most vital.

1. Does President Wilson have the susceptibility to public opinion and the prophetic vision of the future required by the first conception?

2. Does he possess the administrative efficiency (depending seventy percent on the ability to pick men) demanded by the second?

In answering these questions, we should consider his public record with all respect and with all care. We should think of his great successes, like the Federal Reserve Act, and his failures, like the anti-trust laws — both in the realm of internal legislation. We should think of his success in the Panama Canal tolls question and of his far more questionable policy in Mexico and the Far East. We should consider carefully his attitude and utterances during the three opening years of the great war — were they consistent, far-sighted, and bold? Did they show a ready appreciation of the fundamental issues involved? Was his Fabian policy of waiting until public sentiment was behind him wise statemanship? Or would it have been the move of a really great leader to act and draw sentiment after him? We should con-

sider his whole attitude and record in the matter of appointments. We should examine carefully his willingness to change his methods — his power of wise reversal of opinion.

After four years the American public was very evenly divided in its answer to these interrogatives, as the 1916 election showed. But after our entrance into the war a belief and trust in the President's ability amounting almost to a confidence that he is a super-genius has settled in the great majority of Americans. Whatever the defects of his subordinates, he, the centre of all power, remains an unshaken pillar of public trust and hope; if only he can take hold directly, all will go well. Deliver all authority into his hands, follow him implicitly, without question or criticism, and our problems will be solved.

How can this change in popular attitude be accounted for, especially in a year in which our achievements have been admittedly far below our expectations? Is it sound? In answering this, the first consideration is one of psychology. The people were animated with a somewhat pathetic desire and determination to believe. The President was our representative, our spokesman, our chosen leader, in a crisis. We had always been fortunate in our crises — he simply *must* be great. If he really should not

be great, we had no recourse under our system of government, and it was better to cast doubts aside and stand resolutely behind him.

The general internal and international conditions were such as to give him a particularly appreciative audience. The American public were so extremely ignorant of foreign affairs that almost any statement from a person of authority would have seemed plausible. On the other hand, possible foreign critics were disarmed by their delight at seeing us finally come to their assistance at a period when it really began to appear as though they alone could not win. They were anxious to please, fearful lest they might offend, and policy made it incumbent on them to agree with whatever the representative of America might utter. The situation was such that, whatever the ability of any President that might happen to be in office, he was bound to have greatness thrust upon him. It would be hard to conceive of any declaration, of serious form and purpose, so inferior that it would not have been proclaimed as profound wisdom, under the circumstances. And when the President began to speak with all his great power of English expression, and, in certain passages, like that in which he dedicated to the cause "everything that we are and everything that we have," reached truly great heights, it is no wonder that our Allies proclaimed him as the

spokesman of the world and Americans cheerfully assented. But this does not refute the possibility that his views as a whole may have been inconsistent, vague, and lacking in a grasp of the essentials.

As said before, there is no assertion that the President is not all that he is considered. It is an absolute certainty, however, that his record is such that as yet we have no right to act on that assumption. With all reverence to his position and all respect for him as a man, we should not fail to scrutinize his actions and opinions carefully, and criticise when it seems proper. So much is dependent on him that if he should pursue for long a mistaken path, all would be lost. It would be a tragedy passing all understanding if, through a wilful blindness, we should permit a premature judgment to become a delusion.

The next fallacy to be considered is possibly the most important and harmful of all, yet one of the hardest to treat clearly and impartially. It is the belief that for the harmony of the whole, criticism of and among the Allies should be abstained from. Both etiquette and policy have combined in claiming that it should be assumed that an Ally's actions and motives have been perfect. Yet it frequently has been necessary to clear the air within the separate countries — why should not the same apply within

the whole alliance? The efficiency of the different nations has been increased eventually by putting their internal differences of opinion to the issue — would not a little frank talk between the Allies in the past have been better? If the union against Germany is really founded on principle, it can not be endangered by an honest recognition of difference in methods.

There should be an explanation of why the French and English commanders have persistently clung to the "nibbling" strategy from the beginning of the war, no matter what the general strategical situation. It is known that the Russians felt bitterly that they were deserted at the time of the great Austro-German advance upon Warsaw and beyond, which was the greatest single factor in the defeat of Russia and the weakening of her system to where anarchistic germs could gain headway. No less an authority than Mr. Frank Simonds has stated that Germany did practically put the Russian army out of commission in this campaign. To be sure, there was an unexpected recuperation, and Brussilof's attack on the Austrians the following spring showed unexpected power, but the Russian army as a whole had nothing like its former strength and was stopped by comparatively scanty German reserves. During the great Russian retreat, the Western front remained quiet. The Allies attempted no move-

ment on a large scale. Possibly they were not properly prepared. But they must have been superior in numbers. There is little doubt what Mackensen, for example, would have done if he had been the Allied commander. He would have attacked on a wide front with a tremendous number of effectives. He might have sustained great losses; he might have made little headway; but he would have pushed the assault until the pressure on the Russians was relieved, the Russian army preserved, and Russia saved to the alliance. And this course would have been not only logical, but merciful ultimately, for now the war has got to be won on one front, in the teeth of the entire German army and possibly some of the Austrian, instead of on two fronts, with the help of the Russians. Men were temporarily saved, but the ultimate losses will be far greater. The fact that it was probably better in the end for the world that the Russians were defeated and the Revolution occurred does not change the military principles in the situation. Under the circumstances, it would have been well if the Russians had claimed aid and claimed it publicly. Suppose the Tsar had issued a proclamation to his army worded somewhat as follows: "Soldiers! your heroic efforts against a superior foe have staggered him and saved Russia. I know that you will never cease the battle until his advance is

checked and he is forced to retire. I have called on our brave Allies for aid and know that we can soon count on their sacrifices for us, as we sacrificed for them in the marshes of East Prussia. Then by our united endeavors will the situation be saved." There is little doubt that such an appeal would have forced the French and English to make a greater effort than they did.

Secretary Baker stated in his speech to the Senate Military Committee that he did not know, had not asked, and doubted whether he could obtain complete statistics as to what number of British troops were in England and what proportion in France. He implied that we should consider this none of our business and a corollary implication was that the English also would consider it none of our business. This viewpoint can no longer be justified. Our Allies have a right to demand exact knowledge of our measures and plans and we have a right to demand that the following situation be explained:

1. France and England (excluding their dominions and colonies, which have contributed liberally in men) had at the outbreak of the war at least eighty-five million combined population, as against the sixty-seven million of Germany.

2. England and France claim to have raised men absolutely to the limit of their ability.

Each is said to have called from five to seven million to the colors.

3. Germany has been the industrial foundation for the entire quadruple alliance and therefore should have had to retain at least as large a proportion of men in industrial pursuits as France and England.

4. The Germans have, until recently, been forced to employ a large fraction of their forces in the East, while the Allies have kept a greater proportion of their effectives in the West.

5. In view of 1, 2, 3, 4, and in spite of the fact that German internal organization has kept in advance of the Allies, the conclusion is inevitable that the Allies have at hand a greater force than the German.

6. The Germans have usually been on the offensive and have lost, according to Allied claims, in the proportion of two or three or four to one.

7. The individual fighting prowess of the French and English has always been superior to that of their opponents.

8. The Germans always attack in overwhelming numbers and the Allies, when they fall back, do so only when the odds are heavily against them.

9. In view of the above, where are the Allied men? This is not asked sarcastically, but with

a belief that if the men are not there we should be given the reasons frankly why they are not. If the German superiority is no more than that gained by massing men at one point, why do not the Allies try the same tactics at another point?

We should approach these matters humbly, with the recognition that, whatever errors the French and English have made, they have been fighting our battles for years and that nothing we can do will completely discharge the debt we owe them. But we should exhibit a determination to know the exact facts in order that nowhere may effort be relaxed and that the best measures for a complete victory may be taken.

Mr. Lloyd George seems finally to have led the way in this, as in countless other ways. In his speech on the second battle of the Somme, he said frankly, though tactfully, that America had been slower than was expected and that this slowness was a great disappointment. In his speech in reply to the letter of General Maurice, he stated that the taking over of an extra portion of the battle front by the British Army was because there was a feeling in France that the British were not holding their share. He let it be known that there was a difference of opinion between the British and French staffs on the question.

The effect of both speeches has been salutary. The first brought British and American public

opinion to favor the brigading of American troops with French and British divisions. The second strengthened the belief that the only solution on the Western front was one unified army and one supreme generalissimo.

Throughout the war the opponents of Germany have been hindered by their lack of frankness, both with themselves and with each other. They could afford to be frank, while Germany could not, and they have failed to grasp a real advantage. A different policy must henceforth be pursued if the best results are to be obtained. Delusions of any description are poor policy and bad propaganda. The union should be frankly based, as it really stands, on a bedrock of principle and veracity. The war must be won if freedom is to be preserved; and never was it more certain that only the truth can make us free.

VIII

THE FUNDAMENTAL DEFECT

An old time issue for academic debate has been the question of whether the individual exists for the state, or the state for the individual. Like so many debated subjects, however, it is doubtful whether a real controversy of principle exists. Broadly speaking, the end of all government may be said to be the improvement and growth of the individual. The advocate of the pre-eminence of the state will admit that the only way the whole can progress is by the advance in quality as well as quantity of the component units. The real argument lies as to the degree of necessity, in developing the common good, for the individual to subordinate his entire conditions of life and thought to some inner authority representing the whole and working for the interest of the whole, but composed of less than the whole. The answer to this question will vary with diverse conditions. In times of comparative calm it is well that as large a proportion of the people as possible should take an active share in determining public questions, for there is no greater stimulus

to mental development than the effort to project one's self outside of immediate personal environment and deal with large affairs. Thus the process of government is itself one of the large factors in the primary purpose of effecting individual growth. But in times of stress, when the national fabric is beset by internal and external foes, the primary object becomes the preservation of the whole in order to preserve the parts, and that efficiency of the whole which is needed for success can only be attained by subjection of the parts to the best direction and leadership which can be discovered.

This latter situation is where America finds herself at present. A nation like Germany, where two or three master minds like that of Ludendorf can sit at a table and determine over night how the entire resources of a capable, loyal, and patriotic (if misguided) people are to be utilized and launched, can not be combatted by waiting for the crystallization of country-wide public opinion on every question. The problem is of finding the best leaders and trusting them. The government must be of the people, for the people, and only *by* the people to the bare minimum which is necessary to make certain that it really is *for* the people. Never was government more autocratic than during the war term of the great enunciator of our threefold principle of democracy.

The searching question that Americans should ask themselves today is whether our governmental machinery is best adapted to securing and trusting the proper leaders. Not very long ago, a negative answer in the case of "trust" would have been inevitable. The system of checks and balances was performing its function too effectually. But the ever strengthening position of the executive as the focus of public endeavor and thought, combined with the introduction of actual origination and participation by it in the legislative sphere — possibly the greatest achievement of President Wilson — has provided the necessary centralization. What the people and the President wish can not only be done, but done rapidly. The country has also shown a willingness to use to the fullest extent the machinery that has thus been evolved and have put an absolute trust in their President's prosecution of the war that has caused Congress to delegate authority after authority to the tune of mournful complaints that it was abdicating its throne of duty and creating a Czarism in the United States. This recognition on the part of a people as highly trained, self-confident, individualistic, and intelligent as that of this country of the principle of unfettered centralized direction of the war is one of the most encouraging indications of ultimate success.

But the fundamental interrogative must be faced as to whether our willingness to trust and to uphold a centralized executive is accompanied by the imperatively essential machinery for obtaining and maintaining the best leadership within the executive. It would be disastrous to place power with incompetent officials or those which, once on the right road, are later palpably going astray. The theme of this chapter is that there are very grave defects in our system and certain changes that should be made as a matter of precaution entirely unrelated to the question of personalities.

The greatest weakness is the rigid method by which we elect our President at definite four-year intervals. Once chosen, he is beyond all control for a period in which the gravest questions may arise and be settled. Whatever restraint exists is moral. He may heed public opinion, and is almost certain to if it is overwhelming, but is under no necessity of so doing. If public opinion is pronounced, though not overwhelming, he may safely disregard it unless the time for the next election is close at hand. He may be so constituted as not to be readily susceptible to popular currents of thought and, surrounded as he is certain to be with subordinates of his own school and choosing, there are no direct means of impressing the national attitude upon him. There is no doubt but what

President Taft was entirely out of tune with popular sentiment during the last two years of his administration, and there is hardly less doubt that he did not realize the situation until the campaigns for nomination and election.

Possibly the most glaring defect of the rigidness of our system is the fact that in the complicated life of a modern nation problems of unusual seriousness may arise so suddenly that they have formed no part of the discussion under which the administration last elected was chosen. The party in general favor on a question of internal economics might take a stand entirely opposed to public sentiment on some matter of international difficulty later on. Furthermore, even if the party continued to represent the majority on the new issue, the character of the leader who would be chosen to guide the country in one case might be very different from that of the favorite in another. The chances are inconsiderable that the one best fitted to put through banking or temperance legislation would be the best to organize the nation for war.

Congress has not the power to effectively force modification of executive policy in accordance with public opinion. Congress is, on the whole, a more certain but slower barometer of general sentiment than the Presidency. All

private agencies are prone to aim direct at the chief executive first; if he does not respond, or misinterprets, they next work through Congress. But Congress, by its utmost effort, can not shake the course of a determined President. It can refuse the legislation he wishes, but can not, unless the majority is unusual, force measures over his veto, and even then can not be sure of their efficient execution. It could refuse to pass appropriation bills, but this would simply stop the essential routine of government departments and would weaken its position before the country without making clear cut the issue of policy on which it was at odds with the President. At the maximum it can deadlock the wheels of government, but can not force them in any direction opposed by the chief engineer. Almost the only real administrative influence it can wield is by appealing to public opinion through investigation of departments, and, as the recent controversy over the War Department shows, can accomplish little that is substantial — for the time at least.

The Constitution has placed one extreme instrument in the hands of Congress — its right of impeachment. This is entirely useless in the situation we are discussing — it is a personal safeguard against treason or dereliction of duty and in no sense a political process. It is un-

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thinkable and impossible under present conditions that it could be used merely because of an honest difference of policy.

There seems little doubt that the existence of an important defect in our executive system will be generally admitted, but there will be a great deal of disagreement as to whether any remedy can be devised which will obviate it without creating new weaknesses.

One possibility is the shortening of the period between elections. The objections to this are immediately obvious to all. The confusion, the hullabaloo, the personalities, the excitement of a Presidential campaign come often enough as it is. Almost a year is consumed in the preparation, nomination, and carrying through. A President should have a certain period free from thoughts of future re-election or defeat. Furthermore, there is no surety that if the term was reduced to three or two years, unforeseen issues would not still rise in between.

A proposition much discussed at present is a small executive body (the war cabinet) to operate between the President and his subordinates and act as a general co-ordinator of the administrative machine. This idea has many virtues, but does not go to the root of the difficulty. The cabinet would be appointed by, and responsible to, the President, and in no way under the control of Congress. A president could ap-

point his own men, make much or little use of its service as he desired, and in general reduce it to the level of the multifarious boards and commissions already created.

The proposal that the President be elected or subject to recall by Congress will appear undesirable on its face. The people would never wish to delegate their elective power to Congress or give it the power to reverse their verdict at the polls. Add to this the fact that the people will occasionally choose a Congress and President of different parties at the same election and that at the intermediate Congressional election the idea of casting votes for congressmen as an approval or disapproval of Presidential policy has only a very limited application, and it can be seen why the proposition is unsound.

The system that appears most adaptable to the conditions is one along the following lines:

A general manager who will be called the Premier hereafter shall be appointed by the President with the approval of both houses of Congress in joint session. He shall, under the general direction and supervision of the President, exercise the supreme administrative power of the government, with full control over department heads, commissions, and boards. The appointment power shall remain, as at present, in the hands of the President. It shall be the

duty of the Premier to co-operate with Congress and to appear and give complete information on affairs of government as it shall require. The Premier shall have the right to introduce, recommend, and explain legislation, but the right of Congress also to originate legislation on all subjects shall in no way be impaired. Furthermore, and this is the vital point in the whole plan, the Premier shall be required to resign his post either upon a vote of want of confidence by both houses of Congress, or when he himself feels that he has no longer the confidence of the country or is hampered by some cause in the execution of his duties. In the last case it would naturally be his duty first to state the source of hindrance. Upon resignation the President, with the approval of Congress, shall at once proceed to appoint a new premier. In case of rejection of his nominee by Congress the President shall present a new name and so on, until a satisfactory choice is discovered. The Premier himself may have the right to choose a limited number of colleagues to advise and assist him in exercising his power, forming with himself an executive council. The entire responsibility shall be his, however, and his assistants stand or fall with him.

Such is a broad outline of the mechanical features of the plan. The next move is to see how it would fit into our present organization

and to anticipate as far as possible how it will actually operate.

The first hypothetical case will be that of when a popular and capable President continued to enjoy the confidence of the country and the general support of Congress for his policy. In such a case there would be little difficulty in obtaining confirmation by Congress of a nominee satisfactory to him and the Premier with his council would simply be a lever in the administrative organism, relieving the President of much detail and routine and enabling him the better to concentrate his attention on larger questions. The only possible chance for a serious split would be as to a question of the personality of some high Federal officer, such as a cabinet head, and there would undoubtedly be a sufficiently compromising spirit on both sides, unless the matter was of such gravity that it became a question of retention of either the Premier or cabinet officer, when it would properly come to the attention of the country in Congress. The tendency of the President undoubtedly would be to consult with the Premier in the matter of appointments.

The second supposition is that the country is fairly evenly divided in its support of the President and that this sentiment is reflected in Congress. In such a case the administration would be on trial and closely watched and crit-

icised. The President would be judged right, however, until proven wrong, and would probably succeed in securing confirmation by Congress of a Premier fairly satisfactory, though not, perhaps, just the person he would have most preferred. The Premier would be found constantly in Congress, subjected to interrogation and censure, and matters would thus remain until the success or failure of the administration policy swung the balance to one side or the other. The eyes of the nation would be concentrated on Washington, as they should be, while such a critical point in policy was being passed. If the crisis was long drawn out, it might see the rise and fall of several Premiers, according to the fluctuation of sentiment. But as long as public opinion was evenly balanced the President would be able to force his general policy. The fortunes of Premiers would be guide marks, simply shortening and clearing the general path he was pursuing. It should be stated here, in case it is not clearly understood, that Congress might properly show its disapproval of legislative policy of the government by unseating the Premier, even though as a personal administrator he had proven entirely satisfactory.

The third assumption is that through some most unusual political situation the President and Congress were of opposite political parties,

but that public opinion was back of the President. It might seem that Congress, by refusing to confirm his nominations for Premier, could obstruct and tie up the general governmental system. The answer is that the relative power of the executive has so grown in recent decades that no Congress has dared to long withstand it when backed by an assured preponderance of popular sentiment.

The next contingency — and the most interesting and important thus far considered — is where the country earnestly desired some far-reaching measure to which the President was opposed. At present, Congress can refuse to pass disagreeable legislation, but has no method of forcing positive measures upon the President, except by two-thirds vote. It has no means whatsoever to force changes in administrative personnel or organization and both of these may, under certain circumstances, be of grave national import. In the case at hand, Congress would resort to the method of refusing to confirm any Premier who did not announce himself in favor of the policy in question. In that case the issue would be squarely up to the President. If Congress persisted, he might be certain, under modern conditions, that it was backed up by the opinion of the country. He could hardly refuse to give the policy demanded a trial, confident that if he were right and the country wrong,

its inherent defects would soon become apparent.

Finally, we have the extremely important and interesting case of where the personal capability of the chief executive was in question. In political belief he might still represent the country, but he might have shown himself incompetent to properly conduct the government, or the crisis might be such that talent of a quite unusual order must be placed at the head of affairs. An irresistible demand might arise throughout the people for some man or men who through training and known reputation were judged as the only possible leaders through the crisis. The Premiership would be the place through which such leadership could be obtained simply and without too great delay. Whatever his personal opposition, and however bitter the pill, no President could refuse to appoint and sustain a man universally demanded to a position where, if his policy was wrong and the personal confidence of the country unwarranted, his tenure would be temporary and limited.

Undoubtedly readers of the above have been struck with the similarities which the scheme proposed bears to certain features of the English cabinet system. The latter, in some respects, represents the greatest combination of democracy and efficiency yet devised. It has

had the advantage of a long historical development and has kept marvellously attuned to the state of interest and capacity for public affairs of the English people in their own progression. It is under no handicap such as our historical development from separate coequal states and our geographical expanse forced upon us. But the adoption of the feature proposed is not the slavish imitation of an idea which, however excellent in theory, may not be adapted for different conditions. It is believed that it has been so modified that it would fit immediately into our system and improve the general working, while preserving those peculiarities in which it offers advantages even over the English. The power in England rests almost entirely with the Premier. The King, who appoints him (in accordance, to be sure, with certain recognized principles) is little more than a figurehead whose own abilities count little. On the other hand, we would have exercising the appointing power a man who had ability at least far above the average, and should receive the benefit thereof. In England, the defeat of the Premier on almost any measure means either the resignation of the cabinet, the appointment of the leader of the opposition party, and the entire reversal of government policy, or else the dissolving of Parliament and the plunging of the country into the throes of an election. The

result is that far greater caution and forbearance and less initiative must be used by Parliament than would be the case in America, where the defeat of a certain bill or the fall of a Premier would leave the President still superior and would not necessarily indicate lack of confidence in the general policy or administration.

The greatest recognized authority on American government, James Bryce, has declared the ultimate ruling force to be public opinion. This must be true of any democracy and the test of governmental machinery must be its suitability for translating public opinion into action as soon as it has obviously become considered, temperate, and determined. The introduction of such a Premier as proposed would aid in gauging public opinion. The eyes of the whole country would be upon any controversy involving the Premier in a way seldom likely in a mere debate in Congress over some measure, no matter however important, and the various unofficial agencies would hasten to register their views. Popular interest is always greater where some question of personality is involved, even though the issue be entirely one of policy.

In conclusion, it may be said that the plan presented seems to offer a satisfactory solution, under present conditions, of the fundamental problem of obtaining the best leadership in a

democracy which was discussed theoretically at the beginning of this chapter. It continues the process of centralizing power in the hands of the executive, as the American people are more and more inclined to do, and provides safeguards which make the executive better fitted to receive and exercise the authority delegated. It establishes a direct bond between legislative and executive and makes easier the securing of team-play. It retains the valuable system of a four-year election, in which outstanding questions are thoroughly threshed out, the political atmosphere cleared, and the management most in favor at the time given a direct endorsement by the people, while it eliminates the danger that intermediate questions of momentous consequence may be dealt with contrary to public desire and by statesmen not properly equipped. With the country thoroughly back of the President, the Premier is chiefly a useful administrative and legislative aid and fulcrum for public opinion; with the country opposed to the President, the power of the Premier automatically expands until he is temporarily the more powerful of the two and rules the country as long as he retains its confidence.

It is not claimed that there is no other scheme which might be better. Neither has there been any attempt to elaborate the plan in great detail. It is put forward as one simple and

readily obtainable, without the introduction of elaborate and expensive new organization. An ordinary act of Congress would be sufficient, under the Constitution. No attempt has been made to cover every contingency; for example, the rare possibility that a President might absolutely refuse to give the country and Congress the man or measure wanted. If such an occasion arose, the circumstances would dictate the final move. It will grow more and more evident, as our situations become more involved and critical, that the fundamental defect in our government is that of the rigidity of the executive, and the sooner some method of elasticity is derived, the better.

IX

IS IT WORTH THE COST?

There undoubtedly is a great war weariness among the peoples of the chief countries engaged in the war, with the possible exception of Japan and the United States, which have not, up to the present, experienced its horrors on a large scale. Pride and conviction of the justice of their cause impel them onward and would probably make either side as yet spurn any but victorious terms. Still, as is only natural, the question frequently forces itself to the front, "What does all this amount to? Why need this miserable affair have been? Can any results be worth the unprecedented sacrifice of life and happiness?" Let the answer be made by summarizing some of the effects that already have emerged or appear likely to do so. In this process certain aspects already considered will be again alluded to and the way prepared for a consideration of that part of the war still before us, to which the concluding chapter is devoted. Certain of these effects will stand, whoever is the winner; more of them are predicated on a

decisive victory for the Allies — the way the war should end.

The first three are most fundamental and deal with the effects of the war on the great groupings into which humanity was divided. Some results have, therefore, been placed under them as sub-causes and not been given a main division. Before the war, as was discussed in the first chapter, three immense groups seemed to stand out as likely to have the dominating influence in the evolutionary advance of world society in the future: The Anglo-Saxons (British Empire and the United States — in this group must for the moment be included British India, as under Anglo-Saxon influence, though its position is perhaps abnormal); the Slavic group (Russia and lesser Slav states); the East Asiatic group (Japan and China). The first two groups possessed strong political organization, though the second represented a lower material and intellectual plane of civilization than the first. The third was unorganized, unsolidified, and weak, but possessed potential resources and vitality which might make it the chief group of the future. Within it there was one strong but comparatively small unit — the Japanese Empire.

I. The tremendous strengthening of the power and influence of group one, caused by

a. The union effected between Great Brit-

ain and the United States, placing the resources of the latter and skill and foresight of the former in international relations in combination.

b. The drawing together in ever closer bonds of loyalty and co-operation of the self-governing colonies of England, due to their heroic efforts in the war.

c. The unforeseen loyalty and services of India.

d. The forcing of America to reorganize her government and become efficient nationally, as well as individually.

e. The probable introduction of universal military service as a principle of American life.

f. The great extension of Anglo-Saxon influence in the Middle East and Africa, making it likely to be the chief factor in the progress of the latter continent.

II. The break-down of the political strength and unity of the second group, caused by the Russian Revolution and the succeeding splitting up into different states and classes. The question of who will ultimately reunite the fragments is still uncertain. One of the great reasons why the Allies must win a complete victory is to prevent the Germans doing so.

III. The extensive step taken by Japan toward the domination of group three, and the

practical declaration to the world of her intention to gather round herself and direct the destinies of this vast mass of humanity.

a. The taking over of German holdings and rights at Tsingtao and in Shantung province.

b. The powerful political and economic grip on China obtained by the concessions forced from the latter in the spring of 1915.

c. The practical elimination of competitive shipping on the Pacific and the extensive gain in Chinese trade and control of Chinese resources compared with other nations (she has at present more iron holdings than the Chinese government and almost as much as both Chinese government and individuals together).

d. The enunciation of a Monroe Doctrine for China and the securing of at least partial American adherence to it through the Lansing-Ishii agreement.

IV. The enormous impetus given to the spread of the economic doctrine of State Socialism by the demonstration (to a greater or less degree in all the belligerents) of its superior efficiency in the spheres of both production and distribution in thickly populated, highly organized states.

V. The tremendous increase in the political power of organized labor.

VI. The great stride taken in the elimination of the alcoholic evil the world over. Military necessity has enforced prohibition in varying degree in all the chief contesting states.

VII. The general stimulus to the all-sided development of the Russian people, caused by the elimination of the old régime. This is independent of the final political result referred to in II.

VIII. The swinging of the balance ever further to democracy rather than autocracy, as a principle of government.

IX. The increasing emphasis on the necessity for international morality, expressed in the terms "rights of small nations" and "sanctity of treaties."

X. The examination of the whole question as to whether the organization of society into independent nations, each supreme in itself and knowing no law higher than that of its own well being, is not wrong in theory, and, even though the only possible system up to the present, probably inefficient practically in the future.

XI. The growing conception of a world unity is an important result, even though the prevalent idea of a federal league of nations proves entirely impractical and unjust through hindering growth and progress.

There is, of course, no end to the ramifica-

tions of the world war and the effects produced by it. It is believed, however, that the above outline includes a fair proportion of the main results. Numbers one to eight are material, numbers eight to eleven are intangible. Nine, ten and eleven are closely connected and might be combined as "Changes in International Outlook." Not all the results are necessarily beneficial — the extreme centrifugal tendencies in Russia are deplorable, and the increasing control of Japan over China is viewed with misgiving by many keen observers — but, on the whole, they mean, if realized, an acceleration of progress measured possibly in centuries. The realization of most is dependent on the defeat of Germany. They have been worth the past sacrifices, are worth the present hardships, will be worth any cost that may hereafter be exacted, if, and only if, a decisive victory for the Allies is secured.

X

THE OUTLOOK AND THE PROBLEM, 1918

The following review of the present and prospective war situation is drawn up in no alarmist mood, but with the belief that only by the exercise of greater and broader foresight than the opponents of Germany have shown in the past can she be beaten. And such requisite foresight will not be evidenced if all the possibilities of disaster as well as of success are not clearly held in mind.

The great fundamental consideration of the moment is that the siege of the Central Powers is raised and that in the East Germany reigns absolutely supreme. She has eliminated Great Russia as an active factor and, of even greater import, has so divided her and drawn her fangs by peace treaties with Finland and Ukrainia, by the erection of a nominal, even if German controlled, separate state of Poland, and occupation of almost the entire Baltic littoral, that she has no means of effectively defending herself or taking the offensive, did the internal

elements in favor of carrying on the war once more gain the upper hand and displace the Bolsheviki. Roumania has foundered with the larger structure and is now only a prospective source of food and fuel supply for the Central Allies. Bulgaria has seen the Dobrudja renounced by Rumania in a formal treaty of peace and seems in firm occupation of Kavala and those portions of West Macedonia and Eastern Serbia which she has long coveted. Turkey seems about to recover officially the Caucasus provinces taken from her in 1878 and is relieved from the long impending menace from the North. There is every reason for these two small states to continue to trust and support the powerful ally who has made these things possible and whose defeat would mean their revocation. Austria, while freed from the Russian threat to her very existence which caused her to subordinate all direction to the Germans, is still endangered by the aims of Italy and the Allies toward Trieste and the Trentino, and her achievements toward opening a road to the Ægean by the occupation of Serbia and Montenegro would be rendered fruitless by Allied success. Furthermore, her army units and commands are so intermingled with the German that to separate them without mutual consent would be almost impossible. Thus Germany may be said not only to have

broken down all opposition in the East, but to have maintained and riveted the bonds with her allies.

The possibilities for military operations on a large scale are reduced then to the western (including Italian) front. In considering this question it will be assumed that the Germans will stand on the defensive. It would seem obvious in view of the past experience of the war that with inferiority in both quality and quantity of men and material, it would be dashing themselves to useless destruction to attack in force. The colossal egotism of the enemy, which makes him underestimate the capabilities of those opposed, may lead him to such an attempt, but hopes should not be built exclusively upon this.[1]

What then are the chances that the Allies will break the German defense in 1918? The answer must be "slight!" In the last part of 1915 and throughout all of 1917, the French and English admitted possessing a decided superiority on the Western front. But they did not

[1] Since this chapter was composed, the Germans have undertaken their great drive. If, as is probable, it is checked, partially made to recoil, and the war of positions is resumed, the following observations are still applicable. Their truth is proved by the tremendous and unexpected strength which the Teutons were able to muster in the West. If this surplus of effort had been expended in Italy, the Balkans, Russia, and the Levant, it might well have been decisive in those fields.

break the German line, although they mangled it and caused it to recoil in some sections. In 1918 the disparity between the opposing forces will be less. In spite of the necessity of keeping troops in the East to watch Russia and begin the task of organizing the food and other resources of her Eastern occupations, Germany will still be able to transfer a limited number of fairly useful divisions to the West, which can be used in the rear and in relieving better troops for actual line work, in spite of their somewhat dubious quality. And when we contemplate the wonderful speed with which her forces swept into Russia recently, we may wonder whether the troops which made such marches are physically as deficient as has been estimated.

Another feature to be considered is that the entire Austrian army, which in the earlier years of the war was almost exclusively occupied with Russia, is now released for the West, and should be able to do more than merely hold the short and rugged Italian front. On the other hand, it seems generally believed that the American army can not reach France in sufficient force and receive sufficient training to be a great factor in the 1918 campaign.

Thus the conclusion seems justified that with a smaller margin of superiority than in 1917, the Allies will probably not be more successful than in 1917. They may smash the Germans

to pieces, but if they do, it will prove great deficiency in the high command previously.

If, then, the Western stalemate is to continue for a year longer, how is the general course of the war likely to be effected? Is it still true, as said so often in previous stages of the struggle, that time fights against Germany? Before answering this, it is necessary to attempt to forecast certain possible developments in conditions in the East.

It is probable that the Central powers, after leaving sufficient to hold the Allies on the West, will still have sufficient effectives to join Bulgaria in a move against Salonika. The Allied force at that point has been necessarily kept down to a certain number because of the difficulties of transportation. As to the chances of success of this move, we can only refer to the speech of Bonar Law on March 7, wherein he practically admits that the Germans can take Salonika if willing to pay the price. Assuming for the moment that they do, the last Allied foothold and danger point in the Balkans will have been removed, a fine new Ægean base secured for their submarines, and the last hope of the Serbians and Montenegrins for the early resuscitation of their stricken countries blighted.

In the meantime, the Teutons will continue to consolidate themselves in the Ukraine; Odessa

will be seized and every effort made to ensure the raising and transportation of foodstuffs from that country and Roumania. Considering the richness of the regions concerned and the unscrupulousness of the Germans in providing for their own needs first and the natives afterwards, it is probable that their efforts will by next fall show respectable success. They will consolidate their control over the Black Sea and even may stretch across to Baku and seize the oil region on the Western shore of the Caspian. They will be in a position to co-operate with the Turks in operations against Persia and Mesopotamia. They will continue their efforts to get control of Great Russia by intrigue and propaganda and will probably attain a measure of success if the excesses of the Bolsheviki continue and make the respectable elements welcome any power capable of restoring order. They will make all use possible of the prisoners of war in Russia as agents in their effort. There is a danger from this source in Turkestan, where considerable numbers have been sent and which is entirely beyond the radius of Japanese action. The circumstances would be threatening to Afghanistan and Persia if the railway running from the Caspian to Merve and Tashkent could be seized. Germany would undoubtedly try to raise levies from the various Russian and Turanian peoples

in her course. No one can predict with what success. It is certain that she could have an inexhaustible supply of labor which could relieve workers in her own country for the front. She would build railway lines, improve communications, and in general prepare a position whence she might launch a serious attack upon the vital British positions in Egypt, Persia, Afghanistan and India at the outset of 1919.

While other events are taking place, the submarine warfare will be continuing. The efforts of the British and American fleets have reduced this to impotence so far as starving any of the Allies. But they have not as yet succeeded in preventing a constant, even if lessening, diminution in the total world tonnage. And to utilize to the full the enormous strength and resources of the Allies, a shipping instrument far larger than that at the outbreak of war is necessary. Especially will this be the case if it becomes necessary to conduct major operations in the Levant. Therefore, although there is good hope that the submarine will be held in 1918, there is no prospect that the shipping capacity of the Allies will by any means reach the expansion necessary for the full employment of American power.

Thus the answer to our interrogative must be that it is not a certainty that time fights for the Allies. The accession of American

strength in France may be balanced by the ability of Germany to draw from Russia and the East. The foe is almost certain to gradually improve his position in regard to all supplies except men, and if his grip on Russia becomes secure enough he may in time even build up in human material.

Nor should one lay too much stress on the possibilities of internal trouble. War weary as the peoples of Germany and Austria assuredly are, there are few examples in history of a people turning against a victorious government, no matter what the hardships they are called upon to endure. And the possibility of wheat from Rumania and the Ukraine will be a tonic that will hearten them immensely. On the whole, it is probable that whatever embarrassment is caused to the Central governments by dissatisfaction will be balanced by that caused to Allied authorities by greater freedom — profiteering, strikes, etc.

The situation has been painted darkly because of the belief that the only sure way to win is to anticipate the worst and then plan to beat that worst. It is the conviction of the writer that we can win, and should win if the interests of all humanity are to be best served, but we MAY NOT win if we do not play the game differently from in the past. The effort will

now be made to indicate some of the policies which appear necessary for victory.

In the first place, there should be a greater definiteness to our objects in the war, and Americans particularly should be brought to see that our primary moral aims can only be realized by the accomplishment of certain very material results. There is a physical as well as mental side to our purposes. Let us recognize that we are fighting for democracy, sacredness of obligations, for humanity, but let us admit that certain very substantial political and territorial considerations which must be served are at the foundation of this truth. The basic reason why we can claim to be the standard bearer of justice and progress is because we are supporting and resisting the attack on the Anglo-Saxon territorial and institutional structure, which represents and protects throughout the world the rights of individual freedom and initiative combined with ordered justice. This structure is being assailed by the highly capable and developed one of where the individual is subordinated to the welfare of the state and where loyalty, discipline, specialized mechanical capacity in one certain line, rather than all around development, are the qualities required of the individual, and where the rulers of the state are something apart from

the people. This conception has certain indisputable values. The carrying of the system of the specialized expert into government and administration has such obvious advantages that the great democracies will have to adopt it in at least subordinate positions in special fields. Was the government of Germany primarily from and for the people, the distinction between the German and Anglo-Saxon ideal might be one of method rather than of aim, but such is far from the case. Instead it pursues objects of conquest and the imposition of a certain type of so-called culture that are by no means necessarily identified with the welfare of its people. Now, the only possible successful method of combating this ideal is by means of the only other sufficiently powerful material edifice holding opposite principles — the Anglo-Saxon. And so far as it is necessary for the stability of the world, every portion of the far flung British Empire from Fiji to London is vital to democracy. There is no use in dreaming. The masses of India, Africa, Russia, can not manage themselves. Either the English and Americans and French will rule them, or the Germans will. Entire freedom for India, Egypt, tropical Africa, at the present time, would be a calamity and a menace to the security of the liberal nations of the West, and hence of their laboriously con-

structed beneficent institutions. It is a question in either case of temporary rule by an outside imposed authority. But the German rule would be an attempt to mould into an edifice of uniformity, deadening and monotonous, even though for the moment very substantial and imposing. The Anglo-Saxon authority, on the other hand, would strive to quicken into progress the native possibilities now dormant, and to suppress and supplant only where obstacles to growth must be removed and where certain primary institutions necessary for the foundations and for preserving the vital bonds linking the Anglo-Saxon world structure must be established.

Even were the two systems theoretically on a par, there would still be a sufficient argument for the triumph of the Anglo-Saxon one. This is that where it has progressed so far toward the ideal of becoming a coalescing force that will ultimately bring all humanity together, it would be nullifying the work of ages to destroy its world-wide sphere and substitute another still comparatively unextended and of no greater intrinsic worth.

Our fundamental political objective, then, without which all our moral professions will be only so much jingle, is to make certain that the control of the world for the next era devolves or remains in the proper hands. Our

determination to vindicate Belgium and punish the transgressor will avail nothing if we are not prepared to perpetuate the only safeguard against a renewal. This is the Anglo-Saxon world power. Without it any league of peace would be impotent; with it, such a league would have an academic interest and be valuable mainly as a basis for future development. It alone, with France, bars the path of the Teuton. Of the twenty-odd nations that have entered the war against Germany for various motives (not always and entirely altruistic), there is hardly one but what would leave the arena did there seem to be serious doubts of the French and Anglo-Saxon success. And this is not to be held against them; they have no power in themselves to make any but a nominal resistance.

It is believed that if a clear exposition of the concrete material purpose of the struggle were presented to the American people, it would reinforce the enthusiasm, which the able elucidation of the moral side has awakened, by a steady determination born of appreciation of the legitimate interests involved. The trouble with relying on moral forces alone is that they are bound at times to appear confused and forgotten in the complexity of the problems and desires of all parts of the vast coalition facing the Central Powers. Decided shocks are produced by such incidents as the publication of

the secret treaties by the Bolsheviki and the recent agitation for a Japanese occupation of Eastern Siberia. A realization of the political background would awaken more sympathy for the motives of statesmen sincerely anxious to conquer the Germans, who considered themselves justified in using the orthodox methods of history.

In fact, the conviction will gradually be awakened that possibly the only method of winning is to a certain extent to fight fire with fire. For example, if all indications should point to the fact that by intrigue and propaganda the Germans were slowly getting a control of Persia which they could turn to their own ends, the British would be faced with the imperative duty of forestalling that control. The same would apply in the hypothetical case of Mexico and the United States, did the former seem likely to become a hostile base.

Certain problems of the peace conference would also become clearer. The Allies could conscientiously feel that in cases where there was involved no primary moral question of reparation, as in the case of Belgium and Serbia, that they could make such a settlement as would best secure the world against a future menace. Thus East and South West Africa should definitely be assigned to Great Britain, giving her an unimpeded stretch from the Cape to Cairo;

Alsace-Lorraine and certain of the West Rhine provinces should go to France; certain peoples of Austria should be joined to their Rumanian and Serbian and Polish kindred; Constantinople might be internationalized. We should recognize the just rights of small nations, but should not allow "self-determination" to cause us to make a fetish of mere smallness. Whatever the definite arrangement, no terms should be imposed or accepted that did not ensure the definite superiority of the Anglo-Saxon over the Teutonic system. Thus only could the triumph of the moral purposes of the Allies be certain.

The establishment of a proper political viewpoint will aid in gaining a proper perspective of necessary internal organization. The mere statement that we are fighting for liberty and democracy might seem entirely inconsistent to the average mind with a strict policy toward capital and labor. But when it is also clearly seen that complete victory must be attained to make certain Anglo-Saxon superiority, which in turn is at present necessary for liberty and democracy, the country will be more willing to submit to essentially fighting policies. If we are to win, we must adopt, and not too tardily, such measures as conscription of labor, prohibition equally of profiteering and strikes, transfer of the resources of non-essential industries to

essential, and state control of all the vital necessities of the army and the nation. We must not be too Fabian and must realize that in the conduct of war the round table method of Von Hertling is more effective than that of the crystallization of public opinion.

Bearing in mind the view point just explained, let us turn temporarily to another matter infrequently discussed — the possible rôle of China in the war. This may become important if the worst fears in regard to Russia should be realized. For the purposes of the discussion, let it be conceived that Germany, while holding the Allies in the West, succeeded in getting the Russians so completely in her grip and welded to her, that she could begin to draw men for her armies as well as material. In that case her ultimate man power would be greater than that of the Allies, and to expect to win on the Western front alone would be hopeless. To defend would grow increasingly difficult.

Under these circumstances the Allies, to prevent the Kaiser's scheme of world dominion, might have to make use of Chinese and Indian resources. The Chinese are double the number of the Russians, are more compactly situated, and have a long accessible coast line. They are not cowardly, and though inferior to white troops in physique, are superior in hardihood

and endurance. They are docile, easily subjected to discipline and of greater mental alertness than the Russian peasant. In these days when organization, supply, and leadership play such a relatively preponderant part, they could be made into very effective armies. China is one of the Allies and there could be no valid resistance on her part to their undertaking to organize her and supply the leadership. In this task it would be well (for reasons pointed out in the second chapter), that America and Great Britain should play the main part instead of Japan. The problem would be stupendous, but in case of a prolonged stalemate in the West, the decision of the war may yet depend on vast operations on the continent of Asia.

It should be reiterated that only if the worst came should China be urged vitally into the war. Russia should not be given up until entirely lost. Not until it is certain that the Germans can draw men from her should any such move as the Japanese occupation of Vladivostok be approved. Otherwise we would be adding Russia needlessly to the German side. Should some such unthinkable calamity as an agreement between Japan and the Teuton occur, it would become at once necessary for the Allies to separate Japan from the mainland by their fleet and inaugurate the Chinese policy above outlined.

No other method would avert ultimate defeat. However, while this review set out to show the worst, it is not going to insult Japan by considering any such breach of faith within the realm of reality.

It would be an imposition on the reader to close an exposition so tinged with pessimism up to this point without emphasizing some of the brighter aspects. First and foremost, paradoxical as it may seem, is the effect of the Russian Revolution. After all, it marked the overthrow of a more tremendous and blacker despotism than that of the Hohenzollern. One of the discouraging features of the early stages of the war was that the inevitable result of the overthrow of the German autocracy by the Western nations would be to substitute an equally unscrupulous and potentially more dangerous hegemony of the Romanoffs. But there is now no such fear. The two dread spectres clashed and one of them was ground to the dust. The Allies now know that victory means an almost universal triumph for the forces of liberalism and progress. It is, to be sure, necessary that the defeat of Germany be so complete that she can not dangerously dominate on the East. To merely drive her out of France and Belgium and leave her still strong enough to rule Russia and the Balkans would be to lose the war. She must be so beaten that she will have no

reserve capacity for turning the Eastern condition into a power for future aggression. When so beaten, it may not be necessary for the Allies to undo all the work of Brest-Litovsk. With an independent Finland and independent Ukrainia they have no quarrel, provided they can be prevented from becoming German tools. Of course, the unnecessary multiplication of political entities is apt to lead to future squabbles among them, but this can not always be avoided. It probably will suit the Allied plan to complete the arrangement by erecting a powerful Polish state, including Prussian and Austrian Poland, which will serve as an additional safeguard against the Middle Europe menace. In general, it may be laid down as an absolutely indisputable truth that it is better for the world that the Western nations should conquer Germany after six or eight years of war without the help of Russia, than in three years in conjunction with the Russian old régime. Their triumph will leave the Anglo-Saxons in a position to dictate, if they act with foresight and promptness, the settlement of the one great outstanding international problem and danger remaining — the Far Eastern question.

Another hopeful circumstance, as was pointed out before, is that the chances are good that the Germans will not stand on the defensive, but

will play into the Allies' hands by undertaking a Western offensive.

A third lies in the unquestioned superiority of the French and the English, and (by the summer of 1918), of the American troops in fighting quality and morale. There is the prevalent belief that, relying on the concentric siege of Germany, the Allied commanders purposely saved their troops and waited for the results of the blockade and their growing superiority. Now that the two latter props are removed, they may pursue a different policy and the full employment of their strength may bring decisive results with unexpected suddenness.

A fourth is to be found in the better general condition of the Allied peoples and the determination universally displayed. Efforts at greater co-ordination are having their effect and at the pinnacle of the supreme directing war council stands that rare combination of foresight and energy, of radical internal liberalism with truly world-wide vision — Mr. Lloyd George.

There can be no doubt of our ability to triumph. The purpose of this review is to prove that it is necessary that we exercise that ability immediately and to the utmost degree. No halfway measures will suffice. It must be kept clearly in mind that morally the stake is between freedom and despotism, materially be-

tween the Teuton and the Anglo-Saxon as to who shall direct the world for the next century. The stake is worth winning and can be won. Have we really the will to win it?

THE END